# 1nc

## 1

#### Your decision should answer the resolutional question: Is the enactment of topical action better than the status quo or a competitive option?

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’04 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, <http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm>)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A *formal* resolution, after the word "resolved:"

Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “USFG should” means the debate is solely about a policy established by governmental means

Ericson ’03 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb *should*—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, *should adopt* here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### They claim to win the debate for reasons other than the desirability of topical action. That undermines preparation and clash. Changing the question now leaves one side unprepared, resulting in shallow, uneducational debate. Requiring debate on a communal topic forces argument development and develops persuasive skills critical to any political outcome.

#### Engagement with the topic solves their method better—it’s the genesis of the violence they criticize which is key to effective advocacy—their author says it’s a question of the truth claims that inform the advocacy

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Foucault distinguishes this critical ‚return to the origin‛ from mere ‚rediscoveries‛ and mere ‚reactivations‛: a rediscovery promotes ‚the perception of forgotten or obscured figures;‛ 18 and a reactivation involves ‚the insertion of discourse into totally new domains of generalization, practices, and transformation.‛ 19 By contrast, an attempt to transform a discursive practice deeply from the inside by resisting its silences and omissions requires a ‚return to the origin.‛ This critical return involves revisiting the texts that have come to be considered foundational, ‚the primary points of reference‛ of the practice, and developing a new way of reading them, so as to train our eyes and ears to new meanings and voices: we pay ‚particular attention to those things registered in the interstices of the text, its gaps and absences. We return to those empty spaces that have been masked by omission or concealed in a false and misleading plenitude.‛ 20 Foucault emphasizes that the modifications introduced by this critical return to the origin are not merely ‚a historical supplement that would come to fix itself upon the primary discursivity and redouble it in the form of an ornament which, after all, is not essential. Rather, it is an effective and necessary means of transforming discursive practice.‛ 21 **If rediscoveries and reactivations of the past are crucial for extending discursive practices**, a ‚return to the origin‛ that unveils omissions and silences is what is required for a deep transformation of our meaning-making capacities within those practices. The ability to identify omissions, to listen to silences, to play with discursive gaps and textual interstices is a crucial part of our critical agency for resisting power/knowledge frameworks. Lacking that ability is a strong indication of one’s inability to resist epistemic and socio-political subjugation, of the limitations on one’s agency and positionality within discursive practices. And the ability to inhabit discursive practices critically that we develop by becoming sensitive to exclusions—by listening to silences— enables us not to be trapped into discursive practices, that is, it gives us also the ability to develop counter-discourses. Indeed, being able to negotiate historical narratives and to resist imposed interpretations of one’s past means being able to develop counter-histories. Becoming sensitive to discursive exclusions and training ourselves to listen to silences is what makes possible the insurrection of subjugated knowledge: it enables us to tap into the critical potential of demeaned and obstructed forms of power/knowledge by paying attention to the lives, experiences and discursive practices of those peoples who have lived their life ‚in darkness and silence.‛ Foucault opened the 1976 lectures in ‚Society Must be Defended” with a discussion of ‚the insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ 22 In this discussion he highlights two different aspects of subjugated knowledges that are crucial to understand their critical potential, that is, the kind of insurrection that they can be mobilized to produce. In the first place, Foucault emphasizes that subjugated knowledges are ‚historical contents that have been buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations‛ and that are dug up by new forms of scholarship. 23 By resurrecting these buried and masked blocks of historical knowledge, the critique of institutions, discourses, and hegemonic histories becomes possible. For example, Foucault remarks that what made it possible to develop ‚an effective critique of the asylum or the prison‛ was the retrieval—through ‚the tools of scholarship‛—of ‚blocks of historical knowledges‛ present but masked or buried in ‚functional and systematic ensembles.‛ 24 These blocks of historical knowledge make critique possible because they ‚allow us to see the dividing lines in the confrontation and struggles that functional arrangements or systematic organizations are designed to mask.‛ 25 The historical dimension of subjugated knowledges is crucial because it enables us to see, diachronically, different substrata or deposits of ongoing epistemic subjugations by calling attention to the social struggles and conflicts that have been part of the production of institutions and discourses, but have become buried in their interstices. In the second place, Foucault also highlights another key aspect of subjugated knowledges: they are ‚knowledges from below,‛ ‚unqualified or even disqualified knowledges.‛ 26 The lack of sanction or pedigree, their marginalization and stigmatization, is a crucial part of the epistemological subordination or exclusion that makes them subjugated knowledges: they are ‚knowledges that have been disquali-fied as nonceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges: naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity.‛ 27 But Foucault is quick to point out that these disqualified or unqualified knowledges should not be identified with ‚common knowledge or common sense,‛ which is excluded from the realm of science and erudition, but has great currency in mainstream epistemic markets. By contrast, a subjugated knowledge is the one that suffers a more pervasive social exclusion and stigmatization: ‚a knowledge that is local, regional, or differential, incapable of unanimity and which derives its power solely from the fact that it is different from all the knowledges that surround it.‛ 28 These are knowledges that are not articulated or voiced in the proper way, knowledges without accepted credentials; in short, knowledges without social currency because of the history of epistemological exclusions and marginalizations that have kept them out of official markets for epistemic transactions. This second feature of subjugated knowledges is also what makes social critique possible by calling into question official and hegemonic knowledges and interrogating the exclusions that they rest on. Thus, referring to his own genealogical critiques of institutions like the asylum or the hospital and of discourses such as psychiatry or medicine, Foucault remarks that ‚it is the reappearance of what people know at a local level, of these disqualified knowledges, that made the critique possible.‛ 29

#### Debate over a controversial point of action creates argumentative stasis—that’s key to avoid a devolution of debate into competing truth claims, which destroys the decision-making benefits of the activity

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Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a controversy, a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If everyone is in agreement on a feet or value or policy, there is no need or opportunity for debate; the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four,” because there is simply no controversy about this state­ment. Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions of issues, there is no debate. Controversy invites decisive choice between competing positions. Debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants live in the United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have the opportunity to gain citizenship? Does illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? How are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification card, or enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this “debate” is likely to be emotional and intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively, controversies are best understood when seated clearly such that all parties to the debate share an understanding about the objec­tive of the debate. This enables focus on substantive and objectively identifiable issues facilitating comparison of competing argumentation leading to effective decisions. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor deci­sions, general feelings of tension without opportunity for resolution, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the U.S. Congress to make substantial progress on the immigration debate. Of course, arguments may be presented without disagreement. For exam­ple, claims are presented and supported within speeches, editorials, and advertise­ments even without opposing or refutational response. Argumentation occurs in a range of settings from informal to formal, and may not call upon an audi­ence or judge to make a forced choice among competing claims. Informal dis­course occurs as conversation or panel discussion without demanding a decision about a dichotomous or yes/no question. However, by definition, debate requires "reasoned judgment on a proposition. The proposition is a statement about which competing advocates will offer alternative (pro or con) argumenta­tion calling upon their audience or adjudicator to decide. The proposition pro­vides focus for the discourse and guides the decision process. Even when a decision will be made through a process of compromise, it is important to iden­tify the beginning positions of competing advocates to begin negotiation and movement toward a center, or consensus position. It is frustrating and usually unproductive to attempt to make a decision when deciders are unclear as to what the decision is about. The proposition may be implicit in some applied debates (“Vote for me!”); however, when a vote or consequential decision is called for (as in the courtroom or in applied parliamentary debate) it is essential that the proposition be explicitly expressed (“the defendant is guilty!”). In aca­demic debate, the proposition provides essential guidance for the preparation of the debaters prior to the debate, the case building and discourse presented during the debate, and the decision to be made by the debate judge after the debate. Someone disturbed by the problem of a growing underclass of poorly educated, socially disenfranchised youths might observe, “Public schools are doing a terri­ble job! They' are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do some­thing about this” or, worse, “It’s too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a precise question is posed—such as “What can be done to improve public education?”—then a more profitable area of discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies, The statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities” and “Resolved; That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference. This focus contributes to better and more informed decision making with the potential for better results. In aca­demic debate, it provides better depth of argumentation and enhanced opportu­nity for reaping the educational benefits of participation. In the next section, we will consider the challenge of framing the proposition for debate, and its role in the debate. To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about a topic, such as ‘"homeless­ness,” or “abortion,” Or “crime,” or “global warming,” we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish a profitable basis for argument. For example, the statement “Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword” is debatable, yet by itself fails to provide much basis for dear argumen­tation. If we take this statement to mean *Iliad* the written word is more effec­tive than physical force for some purposes, we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose, perhaps promoting positive social change. (Note that “loose” propositions, such as the example above, may be defined by their advocates in such a way as to facilitate a clear contrast of competing sides; through definitions and debate they “become” clearly understood statements even though they may not begin as such. There are formats for debate that often begin with this sort of proposition. However, in any debate, at some point, effective and meaningful discussion relies on identification of a clearly stated or understood proposition.) Back to the example of the written word versus physical force. Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote weII-organized argument. What sort of writing are we concerned with—poems, novels, government documents, web­site development, advertising, cyber-warfare, disinformation, or what? What does it mean to be “mightier" in this context? What kind of physical force is being compared—fists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear weapons, or what? A more specific question might be, “Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring Laurania of our support in a certain crisis?” The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as “Resolved: That the United States should enter into a mutual defense treaty with Laurania.” Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative interpretation of the controversy by advo­cates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be outlined in the following discussion.

#### Decisionmaking is the most portable and flexible skill—key to all facets of life and advocacy

Steinberg and Freeley ‘13

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*Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making*, Thirteen Edition

In the spring of 2011, facing a legacy of problematic U.S, military involvement in Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and criticism for what some saw as slow sup­port of the United States for the people of Egypt and Tunisia as citizens of those nations ousted their formerly American-backed dictators, the administration of President Barack Obama considered its options in providing support for rebels seeking to overthrow the government of Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya. Public debate was robust as the administration sought to determine its most appropriate action. The president ultimately decided to engage in an international coalition, enforcing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 through a number of measures including establishment of a no-fly zone through air and missile strikes to support rebels in Libya, but stopping short of direct U.S. intervention with ground forces or any occupation of Libya. While the action seemed to achieve its immediate objectives, most notably the defeat of Qaddafi and his regime, the American president received both criticism and praise for his mea­sured yet assertive decision. In fact, the past decade has challenged American leaders to make many difficult decisions in response to potentially catastrophic problems. Public debate has raged in chaotic environment of political division and apparent animosity, The process of public decision making may have never been so consequential or difficult. Beginning in the fall of 2008, Presidents Bush and Obama faced a growing eco­nomic crisis and responded in part with '’bailouts'' of certain Wall Street financial entities, additional bailouts of Detroit automakers, and a major economic stimu­lus package. All these actions generated substantial public discourse regarding the necessity, wisdom, and consequences of acting (or not acting). In the summer of 2011, the president and the Congress participated in heated debates (and attempted negotiations) to raise the nation's debt ceiling such that the U.S. Federal Govern­ment could pay its debts and continue government operations. This discussion was linked to a debate about the size of the exponentially growing national debt, gov­ernment spending, and taxation. Further, in the spring of 2012, U.S. leaders sought to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapon capability while gas prices in the United States rose, The United States considered its ongoing military involvement in Afghanistan in the face of nationwide protests and violence in that country1 sparked by the alleged burning of Korans by American soldiers, and Americans observed the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad and Syrian forces as they killed Syrian citizens in response to a rebel uprising in that nation and considered the role of the United States in that action. Meanwhile, public discourse, in part generated and intensified by the cam­paigns of the GOP candidates for president and consequent media coverage, addressed issues dividing Americans, including health care, women's rights to reproductive health services, the freedom of churches and church-run organiza­tions to remain true to their beliefs in providing (or electing not to provide) health care services which they oppose, the growing gap between the wealthiest 1 percent of Americans and the rest of the American population, and continued high levels of unemployment. More division among the American public would be hard to imagine. Yet through all the tension, conflict was almost entirely ver­bal in nature, aimed at discovering or advocating solutions to growing problems. Individuals also faced daunting decisions. A young couple, underwater with their mortgage and struggling to make their monthly payments, considered walking away from their loan; elsewhere a college sophomore reconsidered his major and a senior her choice of law school, graduate school, or a job and a teenager decided between an iPhone and an iPad. Each of these situations called for decisions to be made. Each decision maker worked hard to make well-reasoned decisions. Decision making is a thoughtful process of choosing among a variety of options for acting or thinking. It requires that the decider make a choice. Life demands decision making. We make countless individual decisions every day. To make some of those decisions, we work hard to employ care and consider­ation: others scorn to just happen. Couples, families, groups of friends, and co­workers come together to make choices, and decision-making bodies from committees to juries to the U.S. Congress and the United Nations make deci­sions that impact us all. Every profession requires effective and ethical decision making, as do our school, community, and social organizations. We all engage in discourse surrounding our necessary decisions every day. To refinance or sell one’s home, to buy a high-performance SUV or an eco­nomical hybrid car, what major to select, what to have for dinner, what candi­date to vote for, paper or plastic, all present us with choices. Should the president deal with an international crisis through military invasion or diplomacy? How should the U.S. Congress act to address illegal immigration? Is the defendant guilty as accused? Should we watch The Daily Show or the ball game? And upon what information should I rely to make my decision? Certainly some of these decisions are more consequential than others. Which amendment to vote for, what television program to watch, what course to take, which phone plan to purchase, and which diet to pursue—all present unique challenges. At our best, we seek out research and data to inform our decisions. Yet even the choice of which information to attend to requires decision making. In 2006, Time magazine named YOU its "Person of the Year.” Congratulations! Its selection was based on the participation not of “great men” in the creation of his­tory, but rather on the contributions of a community of anonymous participants in the evolution of information. Through blogs, online networking, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Wikipedia, and many other “wikis," and social networking sites, knowledge and truth are created from the bottom up, bypassing the authoritarian control of newspeople, academics, and publishers. Through a quick keyword search, we have access to infinite quantities of information, but how do we sort through it and select the best information for our needs? Much of what suffices as information is not reliable, or even ethically motivated. The ability of every decision maker to make good, reasoned, and ethical deci­sions' relies heavily upon their ability to think critically. Critical thinking enables one to break argumentation down to its component parts in order to evaluate its relative validity and strength, And, critical thinking offers tools enabling the user to better understand the' nature and relative quality of the message under consider­ation. Critical thinkers are better users of information as well as better advocates. Colleges and universities expect their students to develop their critical thinking skills and may require students to take designated courses to that end. The importance and value of such study is widely recognized. The executive order establishing California's requirement states; Instruction in critical thinking is designed to achieve an understanding of the relationship of language to logic, which would lead to the ability to analyze, criticize and advocate ideas, to reason inductively and deductively, and to reach factual or judgmental conclusions based on sound inferences drawn from unambigu­ous statements of knowledge or belief. The minimal competence to be expected at the successful conclusion of instruction in critical thinking should be the ability to distinguish fact from judgment, belief from knowledge, and skills in elementary inductive arid deductive processes, including an under­standing of die formal and informal fallacies of language and thought. Competency in critical thinking is a prerequisite to participating effectively in human affairs, pursuing higher education, and succeeding in the highly com­petitive world of business and the professions. Michael Scriven and Richard Paul for the National Council for Excellence in Critical Thinking Instruction argued that the effective critical thinker: raises vital questions and problems, formulating them clearly and precisely; gathers and assesses relevant information, using abstract ideas to interpret it effectively; comes to well-reasoned conclusions and solutions, testing them against relevant criteria and standards; thinks open-mindedly within alternative systems of thought, recognizing, and assessing, as need be, their assumptions, implications, and practical con­sequences; and communicates effectively with others in figuring our solutions to complex problems. They also observed that critical thinking entails effective communication and problem solving abilities and a commitment to overcome our native egocentrism and sociocentrism,"1 Debate as a classroom exercise and as a mode of thinking and behaving uniquely promotes development of each of these skill sets. Since classical times, debate has been one of the best methods of learning and applying the principles of critical thinking. Contemporary research confirms the value of debate. One study concluded: The impact of public communication training on the critical thinking ability of the participants is demonstrably positive. This summary of existing research reaffirms what many ex-debaters and others in forensics, public speaking, mock trial, or argumentation would support: participation improves die thinking of those involved,2 In particular, debate education improves the ability to think critically. In a com­prehensive review of the relevant research, Kent Colbert concluded, "'The debate-critical thinking literature provides presumptive proof ■favoring a positive debate-critical thinking relationship.11'1 Much of the most significant communication of our lives is conducted in the form of debates, formal or informal, These take place in intrapersonal commu­nications, with which we weigh the pros and cons of an important decision in our own minds, and in interpersonal communications, in which we listen to argu­ments intended to influence our decision or participate in exchanges to influence the decisions of others. Our success or failure in life is largely determined by our ability to make wise decisions for ourselves and to influence the decisions of’ others in ways that are beneficial to us. Much of our significant, purposeful activity is concerned with making decisions. Whether to join a campus organization, go to graduate school, accept a job offer, buy a car or house, move to another city, invest in a certain stock, or vote for Garcia—these are just a few Of the thousands of deci­sions we may have to make. Often, intelligent self-interest or a sense of respon­sibility will require us to win the support of others. We may want a scholarship or a particular job for ourselves, a customer for our product, or a vote for our favored political candidate. Some people make decision by flipping a coin. Others act on a whim or respond unconsciously to “hidden persuaders.” If the problem is trivial—such as whether to go to a concert or a film—the particular method used is unimportant. For more crucial matters, however, mature adults require a reasoned methods of decision making. Decisions should be justified by good reasons based on accurate evidence and valid reasoning.

#### Dialogue. Debate’s critical axis is a form of dialogic communication within a confined game space.

#### Unbridled affirmation outside the game space makes research impossible and destroys dialogue in debate

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish

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Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab

Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant

professor.

Debate games are often based on pre-designed scenarios that include descriptions of issues to be debated, educational goals, game goals, roles, rules, time frames etc. In this way, debate games differ from textbooks and everyday classroom instruction as debate scenarios allow teachers and students to actively imagine, interact and communicate within a domain-specific game space. However, instead of mystifying debate games as a “magic circle” (Huizinga, 1950), I will try to overcome the epistemological dichotomy between “gaming” and “teaching” that tends to dominate discussions of educational games. In short, educational gaming is a form of teaching. As mentioned, education and games represent two different semiotic domains that both embody the three faces of knowledge: assertions, modes of representation and social forms of organisation (Gee, 2003; Barth, 2002; cf. chapter 2). In order to understand the interplay between these different domains and their interrelated knowledge forms, I will draw attention to a central assumption in Bakhtin’s dialogical philosophy. According to Bakhtin, all forms of communication and culture are subject to centripetal and centrifugal forces (Bakhtin, 1981). A centripetal force is the drive to impose one version of the truth, while a centrifugal force involves a range of possible truths and interpretations. This means that any form of expression involves a duality of centripetal and centrifugal forces: “Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear” (Bakhtin, 1981: 272). If we take teaching as an example, it is always affected by centripetal and centrifugal forces in the on-going negotiation of “truths” between teachers and students. In the words of Bakhtin: “Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born between people collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction” (Bakhtin, 1984a: 110). Similarly, the dialogical space of debate games also embodies centrifugal and centripetal forces. Thus, the election scenario of The Power Game involves centripetal elements that are mainly determined by the rules and outcomes of the game, i.e. the election is based on a limited time frame and a fixed voting procedure. Similarly, the open-ended goals, roles and resources represent centrifugal elements and create virtually endless possibilities for researching, preparing, presenting, debating and evaluating a variety of key political issues. Consequently, the actual process of enacting a game scenario involves a complex negotiation between these centrifugal/centripetal forces that are inextricably linked with the teachers and students’ game activities. In this way, the enactment of The Power Game is a form of teaching that combines different pedagogical practices (i.e. group work, web quests, student presentations) and learning resources (i.e. websites, handouts, spoken language) within the interpretive frame of the election scenario. Obviously, tensions may arise if there is too much divergence between educational goals and game goals. This means that game facilitation requires a balance between focusing too narrowly on the rules or “facts” of a game (centripetal orientation) and a focusing too broadly on the contingent possibilities and interpretations of the game scenario (centrifugal orientation). For Bakhtin, the duality of centripetal/centrifugal forces often manifests itself as a dynamic between “monological” and “dialogical” forms of discourse. Bakhtin illustrates this point with the monological discourse of the Socrates/Plato dialogues in which the teacher never learns anything new from the students, despite Socrates’ ideological claims to the contrary (Bakhtin, 1984a). Thus, discourse becomes monologised when “someone who knows and possesses the truth instructs someone who is ignorant of it and in error”, where “a thought is either affirmed or repudiated” by the authority of the teacher (Bakhtin, 1984a: 81). In contrast to this, dialogical pedagogy fosters inclusive learning environments that are able to expand upon students’ existing knowledge and collaborative construction of “truths” (Dysthe, 1996). At this point, I should clarify that Bakhtin’s term “dialogic” is both a descriptive term (all utterances are per definition dialogic as they address other utterances as parts of a chain of communication) and a normative term as dialogue is an ideal to be worked for against the forces of “monologism” (Lillis, 2003: 197-8). In this project, I am mainly interested in describing the dialogical space of debate games. At the same time, I agree with Wegerif that “one of the goals of education, perhaps the most important goal, should be dialogue as an end in itself” (Wegerif, 2006: 61).

#### Dialogue is the biggest impact—the process of discussion precedes any truth claim by magnifying the benefits of any discussion

Morson 4

<http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331>

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

A belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. This very process would be central. Students would sense that whatever word they believed to be innerly persuasive was only tentatively so: the process of dialogue continues.We must keep the conversation going, and formal education only initiates the process. The innerly persuasive discourse would not be final, but would be, like experience itself, ever incomplete and growing. As Bakhtin observes of the innerly persuasive word: Its creativity and productiveness consist precisely in the fact that such a word awakens new and independent words, that it organizes masses of our words from within, and does not remain in an isolated and static condition. It is not so much interpreted by us as it is further, that is, freely, developed, applied to new material, new conditions; it enters into interanimating relationships with new contexts. . . . The semantic structure of an innerly persuasive discourse is not finite, it is open; in each of the new contexts that dialogize it, this discourse is able to reveal ever newer ways to mean. (DI, 345–6) We not only learn, we also learn to learn, and we learn to learn best when we engage in a dialogue with others and ourselves. We appropriate the world of difference, and ourselves develop new potentials. Those potentials allow us to appropriate yet more voices. Becoming becomes endless becoming. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. Difference becomes an opportunity (see Freedman and Ball, this volume). Our world manifests the spirit that Bakhtin attributed to Dostoevsky: “nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is in the future and will always be in the future.”3 Such a world becomes our world within, its dialogue lives within us, and we develop the potentials of our ever-learning selves. Letmedraw some inconclusive conclusions, which may provoke dialogue. Section I of this volume, “Ideologies in Dialogue: Theoretical Considerations” and Bakhtin’s thought in general suggest that we learn best when we are actually learning to learn. We engage in dialogue with ourselves and others, and the most important thing is the value of the open-ended process itself. Section II, “Voiced, Double Voiced, and Multivoiced Discourses in Our Schools” suggests that a belief in truly dialogic ideological becoming would lead to schools that were quite different. In such schools, the mind would be populated with a complexity of voices and perspectives it had not known, and the student would learn to think with those voices, to test ideas and experiences against them, and to shape convictions that are innerly persuasive in response. Teachers would not be trying to get students to hold the right opinions but to sense the world from perspectives they would not have encountered or dismissed out of hand. Students would develop the habit of getting inside the perspectives of other groups and other people. Literature in particular is especially good at fostering such dialogic habits. Section III, “Heteroglossia in a Changing World” may invite us to learn that dialogue involves really listening to others, hearing them not as our perspective would categorize what they say, but as they themselves would categorize what they say, and only then to bring our own perspective to bear. We talk, we listen, and we achieve an open-ended wisdom. The chapters in this volume seem to suggest that we view learning as a perpetual process. That was perhaps Bakhtin’s favorite idea: that to appreciate life, or dialogue, we must see value not only in achieving this or that result, but also in recognizing that honest and open striving in a world of uncertainty and difference is itself the most important thing. What we must do is keep the conversation going.

#### Dialogue is critical to affirming any value—shutting down deliberation devolves into totalitarianism and reinscribes oppression

Morson 4

http://www.flt.uae.ac.ma/elhirech/baktine/0521831059.pdf#page=331

Northwestern Professor, Prof. Morson's work ranges over a variety of areas: literary theory (especially narrative); the history of ideas, both Russian and European; a variety of literary genres (especially satire, utopia, and the novel); and his favorite writers -- Chekhov, Gogol, and, above all, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. He is especially interested in the relation of literature to philosophy.

 Bakhtin viewed the whole process of “ideological” (in the sense of ideas and values, however unsystematic) development as an endless dialogue. As teachers, we find it difficult to avoid a voice of authority, however much we may think of ours as the rebel’s voice, because our rebelliousness against society at large speaks in the authoritative voice of our subculture.We speak the language and thoughts of academic educators, even when we imagine we are speaking in no jargon at all, and that jargon, inaudible to us, sounds with all the overtones of authority to our students. We are so prone to think of ourselves as fighting oppression that it takes some work to realize that we ourselves may be felt as oppressive and overbearing, and that our own voice may provoke the same reactions that we feel when we hear an authoritative voice with which we disagree. So it is often helpful to think back on the great authoritative oppressors and reconstruct their self-image: helpful, but often painful. I remember, many years ago, when, as a recent student rebel and activist, I taught a course on “The Theme of the Rebel” and discovered, to my considerable chagrin, that many of the great rebels of history were the very same people as the great oppressors. There is a famous exchange between Erasmus and Luther, who hoped to bring the great Dutch humanist over to the Reformation, but Erasmus kept asking Luther how he could be so certain of so many doctrinal points. We must accept a few things to be Christians at all, Erasmus wrote, but surely beyond that there must be room for us highly fallible beings to disagree. Luther would have none of such tentativeness. He knew, he was sure. The Protestant rebels were, for a while, far more intolerant than their orthodox opponents. Often enough, the oppressors are the ones who present themselves and really think of themselves as liberators. Certainty that one knows the root cause of evil: isn’t that itself often the root cause? We know from Tsar Ivan the Terrible’s letters denouncing Prince Kurbsky, a general who escaped to Poland, that Ivan saw himself as someone who had been oppressed by noblemen as a child and pictured himself as the great rebel against traditional authority when he killed masses of people or destroyed whole towns. There is something in the nature of maximal rebellion against authority that produces ever greater intolerance, unless one is very careful. For the skills of fighting or refuting an oppressive power are not those of openness, self-skepticism, or real dialogue. In preparing for my course, I remember my dismay at reading Hitler’s Mein Kampf and discovering that his self-consciousness was precisely that of the rebel speaking in the name of oppressed Germans, and that much of his amazing appeal – otherwise so inexplicable – was to the German sense that they were rebelling victims. In our time, the Serbian Communist and nationalist leader Slobodan Milosevic exploited much the same appeal. Bakhtin surely knew that Communist totalitarianism, the Gulag, and the unprecedented censorship were constructed by rebels who had come to power. His favorite writer, Dostoevsky, used to emphasize that the worst oppression comes from those who, with the rebellious psychology of “the insulted and humiliated,” have seized power – unless they have somehow cultivated the value of dialogue, as Lenin surely had not, but which Eva, in the essay by Knoeller about teaching The Autobiography of Malcolm X, surely had. Rebels often make the worst tyrants because their word, the voice they hear in their consciousness, has borrowed something crucial from the authoritative word it opposed, and perhaps exaggerated it: the aura of righteous authority. If one’s ideological becoming is understood as a struggle in which one has at last achieved the truth, one is likely to want to impose that truth with maximal authority; and rebels of the next generation may proceed in much the same way, in an ongoing spiral of intolerance.

## 2

#### The aff commodifies the suffering of Latin Americans in exchange for your ballot in the debate economy---playing a game where we move scenarios of suffering around like chess pieces for our own personal enjoyment is the most unethical form of intellectual imperialism

Baudrillard 94 [Jean, “The Illusion of the End” p. 66-71]

We have long denounced the capitalistic, economic exploitation of the poverty of the 'other half of the world' [['autre monde]. We must today denounce the moral and sentimental exploitation of that poverty - charity cannibalism being worse than oppressive violence. The extraction and humanitarian reprocessing of a destitution which has become the equivalent of oil deposits and gold mines. The extortion of the spectacle of poverty and, at the same time, of our charitable condescension: a worldwide appreciated surplus of fine sentiments and bad conscience. We should, in fact, see this not as the extraction of raw materials, but as a waste-reprocessing enterprise. Their destitution and our bad conscience are, in effect, all part of the waste-products of history- the main thing is to recycle them to produce a new energy source.¶ We have here an escalation in the psychological balance of terror. World capitalist oppression is now merely the vehicle and alibi for this other, much more ferocious, form of moral predation. One might almost say, contrary to the Marxist analysis, that material exploitation is only there to extract that spiritual raw material that is the misery of peoples, which serves as psychological nourishment for the rich countries and media nourishment for our daily lives. The 'Fourth World' (we are no longer dealing with a 'developing' Third World) is once again beleaguered, this time as a catastrophe-bearing stratum. The West is whitewashed in the reprocessing of the rest of the world as waste and residue. And the white world repents and seeks absolution - it, too, the waste-product of its own history.¶ The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials and hence also in the reprocessing of catastrophe. Bloodsucking protection, humanitarian interference, Medecins sans frontieres, international solidarity, etc. The last phase of colonialism: the New Sentimental Order is merely the latest form of the New World Order. Other people's destitution becomes our adventure playground . Thus, the humanitarian offensive aimed at the Kurds - a show of repentance on the part of the Western powers after allowing Saddam Hussein to crush them - is in reality merely the second phase of the war, a phase in which charitable intervention finishes off the work of extermination. We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and catastrophe, and of the moving spectacle of our own efforts to alleviate it (which, in fact, merely function to secure the conditions of reproduction of the catastrophe market ); there, at least, in the order of moral profits, the Marxist analysis is wholly applicable: we see to it that extreme poverty is reproduced as a symbolic deposit, as a fuel essential to the moral and sentimental equilibrium of the West.¶ In our defence, it might be said that this extreme poverty was largely of our own making and it is therefore normal that we should profit by it. There can be no finer proof that the distress of the rest of the world is at the root of Western power and that the spectacle of that distress is its crowning glory than the inauguration, on the roof of the Arche de la Defense, with a sumptuous buffet laid on by the Fondation des Droits de l'homme, of an exhibition of the finest photos of world poverty. Should we be surprised that spaces are set aside in the Arche d' Alliance. for universal suffering hallowed by caviar and champagne? Just as the economic crisis of the West will not be complete so long as it can still exploit the resources of the rest of the world, so the symbolic crisis will be complete only when it is no longer able to feed on the other half's human and natural catastrophes (Eastern Europe, the Gulf, the Kurds, Bangladesh, etc.). We need this drug, which serves us as an aphrodisiac and hallucinogen. And the poor countries are the best suppliers - as, indeed, they are of other drugs. We provide them, through our media, with the means to exploit this paradoxical resource, just as we give them the means to exhaust their natural resources with our technologies. Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in cynical mode by the news media, and carried forward in moral mode by our humanitarian aid, which is a way of encouraging it and ensuring its continuity, just as economic aid is a strategy for perpetuating under-development. Up to now, the financial sacrifice has been compensated a hundredfold by the moral gain. But when the catastrophe market itself reaches crisis point, in accordance with the implacable logic of the market, when distress becomes scarce or the marginal returns on it fall from overexploitation, when we run out of disasters from elsewhere or when they can no longer be traded like coffee or other commodities, the West will be forced to produce its own catastrophe for itself , in order to meet its need for spectacle and that voracious appetite for symbols which characterizes it even more than its voracious appetite for food. It will reach the point where it devours itself. When we have finished sucking out the destiny of others, we shall have to invent one for ourselves. The Great Crash, the symbolic crash, will come in the end from us Westerners, but only when we are no longer able to feed on the hallucinogenic misery which comes to us from the other half of the world.¶ Yet they do not seem keen to give up their monopoly. The Middle East, Bangladesh, black Africa and Latin America are really going flat out in the distress and catastrophe stakes, and thus in providing symbolic nourishment for the rich world. They might be said to be overdoing it: heaping earthquakes, floods, famines and ecological disasters one upon another, and finding the means to massacre each other most of the time. The 'disaster show' goes on without any let-up and our sacrificial debt to them far exceeds their economic debt. The misery with which they generously overwhelm us is something we shall never be able to repay. The sacrifices we offer in return are laughable (a tornado or two, a few tiny holocausts on the roads, the odd financial sacrifice) and, moreover, by some infernal logic, these work out as much greater gains for us, whereas our kindnesses have merely added to the natural catastrophes another one immeasurably worse: the demographic catastrophe, a veritable epidemic which we deplore each day in pictures.

#### Their author votes neg—use of subjugated knowledges for the ballot turns the aff

Medina, their author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Insurrectionary genealogies exploit the openness of our (indefinitely multiple) pasts. As G.H. Mead suggested in the Philosophy of the Present (1949), the past is as open as the future,56 and they are both equally dependent on the present. As Mead puts it, ‚the novelty of every future demands a novel past.‛ 57 The past is renewed in and through our interpretative practices; it is rendered present in our lives through interpretations that are always the result of re-descriptions and negotiations from the vantage point of the present informed by our current vision of the future.58 For this reason, our past is incessantly novel: we make it and remake it, incessantly, in every present.59 But here an important worry arises: the worry of instrumentalization. We can do harm to past subjects by instrumentalizing their struggles, by co-opting their voices and experiences and using them for our own purposes. If forgetting or ignoring past subjects and their struggles can be unjust, we also commit injustices through the **epistemic spoliation of past lives**. We have obligations with respect to subjects of the past, who had their own interests and values. For example, those who have lived under slavery, the victims of Auschwitz, those tortured and killed by dictatorial regimes, the thousands who die every year in the USA without medi- cal attention or basic necessities, and many others should be remembered not simply because we find it useful or in our interest, but because their lives and deaths deserve critical attention and to be put in relation to our own. Following Mead as well as critical theorists as different as Jürgen Habermas and Walter Benjamin, James Bohman (2009) and Max Pensky (2009) have argued against the instrumentalization of the past and for the need to give moral recognition to past subjects and moral weight to their experiences and perspectives. As Bohman puts it, ‚we do not just deliberate about the past but rather with the past.‛ 60 From a Foucaultian perspective the instrumentalization worry is appeased not by giving moral recognition to subjects of the past as partners in deliberation, but rather, by acknowledging their agency and power/knowledges, whether or not these can be recruited to our deliberation processes in the way we would like.

#### Translating misery into capital is a perverse system of neoimperial academia---vote negative to reject their cherry-picking of misery and refuse to engage in the trauma economy

Tomsky 11 (Terri, Ph.D in English from U-British Columbia, postdoctoral fellow in cultural memory at the University of Alberta From Sarajevo to 9/11: Travelling Memory and the Trauma Economy, Parallax Volume 17, Issue 4, 2011)

In contrast to the cosmopolitization of a Holocaust cultural memory,1 there exist experiences of trauma that fail to evoke recognition and subsequently, compassion and aid. What is it exactly that confers legitimacy onto some traumatic claims and anonymity onto others? This is not merely a question of competing victimizations, what geographer Derek Gregory has criticized as the process of ‘cherry-picking among [ . . . ] extremes of horror’, but one that engages issues of the international travel, perception and valuation of traumatic memory.2 This seemingly arbitrary determination engrosses the e´migre´ protagonist of Dubravka Ugresic’s 2004 novel, The Ministry of Pain, who from her new home in Amsterdam contemplates an uneven response to the influx of claims by refugees fleeing the Yugoslav wars: The Dutch authorities were particularly generous about granting asylum to those who claimed they had been discriminated against in their home countries for ‘sexual differences’, more generous than to the war’s rape victims. As soon as word got round, people climbed on the bandwagon in droves. The war [ . . . ] was something like the national lottery: while many tried their luck out of genuine misfortune, others did it simply because the opportunity presented itself.3¶ Traumatic experiences are described here in terms analogous to social and economic capital. What the protagonist finds troubling is that some genuine refugee claimants must invent an alternative trauma to qualify for help: the problem was that ‘nobody’s story was personal enough or shattering enough. Because death itself had lost its power to shatter. There had been too many deaths’.4 In other words, the mass arrival of Yugoslav refugees into the European Union means that war trauma risks becoming a surfeit commodity and so decreases in value. I bring up Ugresic’s wry observations about trauma’s marketability because they enable us to conceive of a trauma economy, a circuit of movement and exchange where traumatic memories ‘travel’ and are valued and revalued along the way.¶ Rather than focusing on the end-result, the winners and losers of a trauma ‘lottery’, this article argues that there is, in a trauma economy, no end at all, no fixed value to any given traumatic experience. In what follows I will attempt to outline the system of a trauma economy, including its intersection with other capitalist power structures, in a way that shows how representations of trauma continually circulate and, in that circulation enable or disable awareness of particular traumatic experience across space and time. To do this, I draw extensively on the comic nonfiction of Maltese-American writer Joe Sacco and, especially, his retrospective account of newsgathering during the 1992–1995 Bosnian war in his 2003 comic book, The Fixer: A Story From Sarajevo.5 Sacco is the author of a series of comics that represent social life in a number of the world’s conflict zones, including the Palestinian territories and the former Yugoslavia. A comic artist, Sacco is also a journalist by profession who has first-hand experience of the way that war and trauma are reported in the international media. As a result, his comics blend actual reportage with his ruminations on the media industry. The Fixer explores the siege of Sarajevo (1992–1995) as part of a larger transnational network of disaster journalism, which also critically, if briefly, references the September eleventh, 2001 attacks in New York City. Sacco’s emphasis on the transcultural coverage of these traumas, with his comic avatar as the international journalist relaying information on the Bosnian war, emphasizes how trauma must be understood in relation to international circuits of mediation and commodification. My purpose therefore is not only to critique the aesthetic of a travelling traumatic memory, but also to call attention to the material conditions and networks that propel its travels.¶ Travelling Trauma Theorists and scholars have already noted the emergence, circulation and effects of traumatic memories, but little attention has been paid to the travelling itself. This is a concern since the movement of any memory must always occur within a material framework. The movement of memories is enabled by infrastructures of power, and consequently mediated and consecrated through institutions. So, while some existing theories of traumatic memory have made those determining politics and policies visible, we still don’t fully comprehend the travel of memory in a global age of media, information networks and communicative capitalism.6 As postcolonial geographers frequently note, to travel today is to travel in a world striated by late capitalism. The same must hold for memory; its circulation in this global media intensive age will always be reconfigured, transvalued and even commodified by the logic of late capital.¶ While we have yet to understand the relation between the travels of memory (traumatic or otherwise) and capitalism, there are nevertheless models for the circulation of other putatively immaterial things that may prove instructive. One of the best, I think, is the critical insight of Edward W. Said on what he called ‘travelling theory’.7 In 1984 and again in 1994, Said wrote essays that described the reception and reformulation of ideas as they are uprooted from an original historical and geographical context and propelled across place and time. While Said’s contribution focuses on theory rather than memory, his reflections on the travel and transformation of ideas provide a comparison which helpfully illuminates the similar movements of what we might call ‘travelling trauma’. Ever attendant to the historical specificities that prompt transcultural transformations, the ‘Travelling Theory’ essays offers a Vichian humanist reading of cultural production; in them, Said argues that theory is not given but made. In the first instance, it emanates out of and registers the sometimes urgent historical circumstances of its theorist.¶ Subsequently, he maintains, when other scholars take up the theory, they necessarily interpret it, additionally integrating their own social and historical experiences into it, so changing the theory and, often, authorizing it in the process. I want to suggest that Said’s bird’s eye view of the intellectual circuit through which theory travels, is received and modified can help us appreciate the movement of cultural memory. As with theory, cultural memories of trauma are lifted and separated from their individual source as they travel; they are mediated, transmitted and institutionalized in particular ways, depending on the structure of communication and communities in which they travel.¶ Said invites his readers to contemplate how the movement of theory transforms its meanings to such an extent that its significance to sociohistorical critique can be drastically curtailed. Using Luka´ cs’s writings on reification as an example, Said shows how a theory can lose the power of its original formulation as later scholars take it up and adapt it to their own historical circumstances. In Said’s estimation, Luka´ cs’s insurrectionary vision became subdued, even domesticated, the wider it circulated. Said is especially concerned to describe what happens when such theories come into contact with academic institutions, which impose through their own mode of producing cultural capital, a new value upon then. Said suggests that this authoritative status, which imbues the theory with ‘prestige and the authority of age’, further dulls the theory’s originally insurgent message.8 When Said returned to and revised his essay some ten years later, he changed the emphasis by highlighting the possibilities, rather than the limits, of travelling theory.¶ ‘Travelling Theory Reconsidered’, while brief and speculative, offers a look at the way Luka´ cs’s theory, transplanted into yet a different context, can ‘flame [ . . . ] out’ in a radical way.9 In particular, Said is interested in exploring what happens when intellectuals like Theodor Adorno and Franz Fanon take up Luka´ cs: they reignite the ‘fiery core’ of his theory in their critiques of capitalist alienation and French colonialism. Said is interested here in the idea that theory matters and that as it travels, it creates an ‘intellectual [ . . . ] community of a remarkable [ . . . ] affiliative’ kind.10 In contrast to his first essay and its emphasis on the degradation of theoretical ideas, Said emphasizes the way a travelling theory produces new understandings as well as new political tools to deal with violent conditions and disenfranchized subjects. Travelling theory becomes ‘an intransigent practice’ that goes beyond borrowing and adaption.11 As Said sees it, both Adorno and Fanon ‘refuse the emoluments offered by the Hegelian dialectic as stabilized into resolution by Luka´ cs’.12 Instead they transform Luka´ cs into their respective locales as ‘the theorist of permanent dissonance as understood by Adorno, [and] the critic of reactive nationalism as partially adopted by Fanon in colonial Algeria’.13¶ Said’s set of reflections on travelling theory, especially his later recuperative work, are important to any account of travelling trauma, since it is not only the problems of institutional subjugation that matter; additionally, we need to affirm the occurrence of transgressive possibilities, whether in the form of fleeting transcultural affinities or in the effort to locate the inherent tensions within a system where such travel occurs. What Said implicitly critiques in his 1984 essay is the negative effects of exchange, institutionalization and the increasing use-value of critical theory as it travels within the academic knowledge economy; in its travels, the theory becomes practically autonomous, uncoupled from the theorist who created it and the historical context from which it was produced. This seems to perfectly illustrate the international circuit of exchange and valuation that occurs in the trauma economy.¶ In Sacco’s The Fixer, for example, it is not theory, but memory, which travels from Bosnia to the West, as local traumas are turned into mainstream news and then circulated for consumption. By highlighting this mediation, The Fixer explicitly challenges the politics that make invisible the maneuvers of capitalist and neoimperial practices. Like Said, Sacco displays a concern with the dissemination and reproduction of information and its consequent effects in relation to what Said described as ‘the broader political world’.14 Said’s anxiety relates to the academic normativization of theory (a ‘tame academic substitution for the real thing’15), a transformation which, he claimed, would hamper its uses for society.¶ A direct line can be drawn from Said’s discussion of the circulation of discourse and its (non)political effects, and the international representation of the 1992–1995 Bosnian war. The Bosnian war existed as a guerre du jour, the successor to the first Gulf War, receiving saturation coverage and represented daily in the Western media. The sustained presence of the media had much to do with the proximity of the war to European cities and also with the spectacular visibility of the conflict, particularly as it intensified. The bloodiest conflict to have taken place in Europe since the Second World War, it displaced two million people and was responsible for over 150,000 civilian casualties.16 Yet despite global media coverage, no decisive international military or political action took place to suspend fighting or prevent ethnic cleansing in East Bosnia, until after the massacre of Muslim men and boys at Srebrenica in 1995. According to Gregory Kent, western perceptions about the war until then directed the lack of political will within the international community, since the event was interpreted, codified and dismissed as an ‘ethnic’, ‘civil’ war and ‘humanitarian crisis’, rather than an act of (Serbian) aggression against (Bosnian) civilians.17¶ The rather bizarre presence of a large international press corps, hungry for drama and yet comfortably ensconced in Sarajevo’s Holiday Inn amid the catastrophic siege of that city, prompted Jean Baudrillard to formulate his theory of the hyperreal. In an article for the Paris newspaper Libe´ration in 1993, Baudrillard writes of his anger at the international apathy towards the Bosnian crisis, denouncing it as a ‘spectral war’.18 He describes it as a ‘hyperreal hell’ not because the violence was in a not-so-distant space, but because of the way the Bosnians were ‘harassed by the [international] media and humanitarian agencies’.19 Given this extensive media coverage, it is important to evaluate the role of representative discourses in relation to violence and its after effects. To begin with, we are still unsure of the consequences of this saturation coverage, though scholars have since elaborated on the racism framing much of the media discourses on the Yugoslav wars.20 More especially, it is¶ the celebrity of the Bosnian war that makes a critical evaluation of its current status in today’s media cycle all the more imperative. Bosnia’s current invisibility is fundamentally related to a point Baudrillard makes towards the end of his essay: ‘distress, misery and suffering have become the raw goods’ circulating in a global age of ‘commiseration’.21 The ‘demand’ created by a market of a sympathetic, yet selfindulgent spectators propels the global travel of trauma (or rather, the memory of that trauma) precisely because Bosnian suffering has a ‘resale value on the futures markets’.22 To treat traumatic memory as currency not only acknowledges the fact that travelling memory is overdetermined by capitalism; more pertinently, it recognizes the global system through which traumatic memory travels and becomes subject to exchange and flux. To draw upon Marx: we can comprehend trauma in terms of its fungible properties, part of a social ‘relation [that is] constantly changing with time and place’.23 This is what I call the trauma economy. By trauma economy, I am thinking of economic, cultural, discursive and political structures that guide, enable and ultimately institutionalize the representation, travel and attention to certain traumas.¶ The Trauma Economy in Joe Sacco’s The Fixer Having introduced the idea of a trauma economy and how it might operate, I want to turn to Sacco because he is acutely conscious of the way representations of trauma circulate in an international system. His work exposes the infrastructure and logic of a trauma economy in war-torn Bosnia and so echoes some of the points made by Said about the movement of theory. As I examine Sacco’s critical assessment of the Bosnian war, I want to bear in mind Said’s discussion about the effects of travel on theory and, in particular, his two contrasting observations: first, that theory can become commodified and second, that theory enables unexpected if transient solidarities across cultures. The Fixer takes up the notion of trauma as transcultural capital and commodity, something Sacco has confronted in his earlier work on Bosnia.24 The Fixer focuses on the story of Neven, a Sarajevan local and the ‘fixer’ of the comic’s title, who sells his services to international journalists, including Sacco’s avatar. The comic is¶ set in 2001, in postwar Sarajevo and an ethnically partitioned and economically devastated Bosnia, but its narrative frequently flashes back to the conflict in the mid- 1990s, and to what has been described as ‘the siege within the siege’.25 This refers not just to Sarajevo’s three and a half year siege by Serb forces but also to its backstage: the concurrent criminalization of Sarajevo through the rise of a wartime black market economy from which Bosniak paramilitary groups profited and through which they consolidated their power over Sarajevan civilians. In these flashbacks, The Fixer addresses Neven’s experience of the war, first, as a sniper for one of the Bosniak paramilitary units and, subsequently, as a professional fixer for foreign visitors, setting them up with anything they need, from war stories and tours of local battle sites to tape recorders and prostitutes. The contemporary, postwar scenes detail the ambivalent friendship between Neven and Sacco’s comic avatar. In doing so, The Fixer spares little detail about the economic value of trauma: Neven’s career as a fixer after all is reliant on what Sacco terms the ‘flashy brutality of Sarajevo’s war’.26 Even Neven admits as much to his interlocutor, without irony, let alone compassion: ‘“When massacres happened,” Neven once told me, “those were the best times. Journalists from all over the world were coming here”’.27¶ The Fixer never allows readers to forget that Neven provides his services in exchange for hard cash. So while Neven provides vital – indeed for Sacco’s avatar often the only – access to the stories and traumas of the war, we can never be sure whether he is a reliable witness or merely an opportunistic salesman. His anecdotes have the whiff of bravura about them. He expresses pride in his military exploits, especially his role in a sortie that destroyed several Serb tanks (the actual number varies increasingly each time the tale is told). He tells Sacco that with more acquaintances like himself, he ‘could have broken the siege of Sarajevo’.28 Neven’s heroic selfpresentation is consistently undercut by other characters, including Sacco’s avatar, who ironically renames him ‘a Master in the School of Front-line Truth’ and even calls upon the reader to assess the situation. One Sarajevan local remembers Neven as having a ‘big imagination’29; others castigate him as ‘unstable’30; and those who have also fought in the war reject his claims outright, telling Sacco, ‘it didn’t happen’.31¶ For Sacco’s avatar though, Neven is ‘a godsend’.32 Unable to procure information from the other denizens of Sarajevo, he is delighted to accept Neven’s version of events: ‘Finally someone is telling me how it was – or how it almost was, or how it could have been – but finally someone in this town is telling me something’.33 This discloses the true value of the Bosnian war to the Western media: getting the story ‘right’ factually is less important than getting it ‘right’ affectively. The purpose is to extract a narrative that evokes an emotional (whether voyeuristic or empathetic) response from its audience. Here we see a good example of the way a traumatic memory circulates in the trauma economy, as it travels from its site of origin and into a fantasy of a reality. Neven’s mythmaking – whether motivated by economic opportunism, or as a symptom of his own traumatized psyche – reflects back to the international community a counter-version of mediated events and spectacular traumas that appear daily in the Western media. It is worth adding that his mythmaking only has value so long as it occurs within preauthorized media circuits.¶ When Neven attempts to bypass the international journalists and sell his story instead directly to a British magazine, the account of his wartime ‘action against the 43 tanks’ is rejected on the basis that they ‘don’t print fiction’.34 The privilege of revaluing and re-narrating the trauma is reserved for people like Sacco’s avatar, who has no trouble adopting a mythic and hyperbolic tone in his storytelling: ‘it is he, Neven, who has walked through the valley of the shadow of death and blown things up along the way’.35¶ Yet Neven’s urge to narrate, while indeed part of his job, is a striking contrast to the silence of other locals. When Sacco arrives in Sarajevo in 2001 for his follow-up story, he finds widespread, deliberate resistance to his efforts to gather first-hand testimonies. Wishing to uncover the city’s ‘terrible secrets’, Sacco finds his ‘research has stalled’, as locals either refuse to meet with him or cancel their appointments.36 The suspiciousness and hostility Sacco encounters in Sarajevo is a response precisely to the international demand for trauma of the 1990s. The mass media presence during the war did little to help the city’s besieged residents; furthermore, international journalists left once the drama of war subsided to ‘the last offensives grinding up the last of the last soldiers and civilians who will die in this war’.37 The media fascination¶ with Sarajevo’s humanitarian crisis was as intense as it was fleeting and has since been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. For not only is Sacco ignorant about the muddled ethnic realities of the war, its moral ambiguities and its key players but he also wants to hear Neven’s shamelessly daring and dirty account of the war, however unreliable. As Sacco explains, he’s ‘a little enthralled, a little infatuated, maybe a little in love and what is love but a transaction’.39 Neven – a hardened war veteran – provides the goods, the first-hand experience of war and, for Sacco’s avatar, that is worth every Deutschemark, coffee and cigarette. He explains in a parenthetical remark to his implied reader: ‘I would be remiss if I let you think that my relationship with Neven is simply a matter of his shaking me down. Because Neven was the first friend I made in Sarajevo . . . [he’s] travelled one of the war’s dark roads and I’m not going to drop him till he tells me all about it’.40 Sacco’s assertion here suggests something more than a mutual exploitation. The word ‘friend’ describing Sacco’s relationship to Neven is quickly replaced by the word ‘drop’. Having sold his ‘raw goods’, Neven finds that the trauma economy in the postwar period has already devalued his experience by disengaging with Bosnia’s local traumas. As Sacco suggests, ‘the war moved on and left him behind [ . . . ] The truth is, the war quit Neven’.41 The Neven of 2001 is not the brash Neven of old, but a pasty-looking unemployed forty-year old and recovering alcoholic, who takes pills to prevent his ‘anxiety attacks’.42 His wartime actions lay heavily on his conscience, despite his efforts to ‘stash [ . . . ] deep’ his bad memories.43 The Fixer leaves us with an ironic fact: Neven, who has capitalized on trauma during the war, is now left traumatized and without capital in the postwar situation.¶ Juxtaposing Traumas in a Global Age¶ Sacco’s depiction of the trauma economy certainly highlights the question of power and exploitation, since so many of the interactions between locals and international visitors are shaped by the commodity market of traumatic memories. And while The Fixer provides a new perspective of the Bosnian war, excoriating the profit-seeking objectives of both the media and the Bosnian middle-men amid life-altering events, its general point about the capitalistic vicissitudes of the trauma economy is not significantly different from that sustained in the narratives of Aleksandar Hemon, Rajiv Chandrasekaran or Art Spiegelman.44What distinguishes Sacco’s work is the way it also picks up the possibility described in Edward Said’s optimistic re-reading of travel: the potential for affiliation. As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. been described as central to the ensuing ‘compassion fatigue’ of Western viewers.38 In contrast to this coverage, which focused on the casualties and victims of the war, The Fixer reveals a very different story: the rise of Bosniak paramilitary groups, their contribution (both heroic and criminal) to the war and their ethnic cleansing of non- Muslim civilians from the city. Herein lies the appeal of Neven, a Bosnian-Serb, who has fought under Bosnian- Muslim warlords defending Sarajevo and who considers himself a Bosnian citizen first before any other ethnic loyalty. 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As I see it, Sacco’s criticism isn’t leveled merely at the moral grey zone created during the Bosnian war: he is more interested in the framework of representations themselves that mediate, authorize, commemorate and circulate trauma in different ways. suffering’.48 Instead, the panel places Sacco’s (Anglophone) audience within the familiar, emotional context of the September 11, 2001 attacks, with their attendant anxieties, shock and grief and so contributes to a blurring of the hierarchical lines set up between different horrors across different spaces. Consequently, I do not see Sacco’s juxtaposition of traumas as an instance of what Michael Rothberg calls, ‘competitive memory’, the victim wars that pit winners against losers.49 Sacco gestures towards a far more complex idea that takes into account the highly mediated presentations of both traumas, which nonetheless evokes Rothberg’s notion of multidirectional memory by affirming the solidarities of trauma alongside their differences. In drawing together these two disparate events, Sacco’s drawings echo the critical consciousness in Said’s ‘Travelling Theory’ essay. Rather than suggesting one trauma is, or should be, more morally legitimate than the other, Sacco is sharply attentive to the way trauma is disseminated and recognized in the political world. The attacks on theWorld Trade Centre, like the siege of Sarajevo, transformed into discursive form epitomize what might be called victim narratives. In this way, the United States utilized international sympathy (much of which was galvanized by the stunning footage of the airliners crashing into the towers) to launch a retaliatory campaign against Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In contrast, Bosnia in 1992 faced a precarious future, having just proclaimed its independence. As we discover in The Fixer, prior to Yugoslavia’s break-up, Bosnia had been ordered to return its armaments to the Yugoslav National Army (JNA), which were then placed ‘into the hands of the rebel Serbs’, leaving the Bosnian government to ‘build an army almost from scratch’.50 The analogy between 9/11 and 1992 Sarajevo is stark: Sarajevo’s empty landscape in the panel emphasizes its defencelessness and isolation. The Fixer constantly reminds the reader about the difficulties of living under a prolonged siege in ‘a city that is cut off and being starved into submission’.51 In contrast, September 11, 2001 has attained immense cultural capital because of its status as a significant U.S. trauma. This fact is confirmed by its profound visuality, which crystallized the spectacle and site of trauma. Complicit in this process, the international press consolidated and legitimated the event’s symbolic power, by representing, mediating and dramatizing the trauma so that, as SlavojZ ˇ izˇek writes, the U.S. was elevated into ‘the sublime victim of Absolute Evil’.52 September 11 was constructed as an exceptional event, in terms of its irregular circumstances and the symbolic enormity both in the destruction of iconic buildings and in the attack on U.S. soil. Such a construction seeks to overshadow perhaps all recent international traumas and certainly all other U.S. traumas and sites of shock. Sacco’s portrayal, which locates September eleven in Sarajevo 1992, calls into question precisely this claim towards the singularity of any trauma. The implicit doubling and prefiguring of the 9/11 undercuts the exceptionalist rhetoric associated with the event. Sacco’s strategy encourages us to think outside of hegemonic epistemologies, where one trauma dominates and becomes more meaningful than others. Crucially, Sacco reminds his audience of the cultural imperialism that frames the spectacle of news and the designation of traumatic narratives in particular.¶ Postwar Bosnia and Beyond 2001 remains, then, both an accidental and a significant date in The Fixer. While the (Anglophone) world is preoccupied with a new narrative of trauma and a sense of historical rupture in a post 9/11 world, Bosnia continues to linger in a postwar limbo. Six years have passed since the war ended, but much of Bosnia’s day-to-day economy remains coded by international perceptions of the war. No longer a haven for aspiring journalists, Bosnia is now a thriving economy for international scholars of trauma and political theory, purveyors of thanotourism,53 UN peacekeepers and post-conflict nation builders (the ensemble of NGOs, charity and aid workers, entrepreneurs, contractors, development experts, and EU government advisors to the Office of the High Representative, the foreign overseer of the protectorate state that is Bosnia). On the other hand, many of Bosnia’s locals face a grim future, with a massive and everincreasing unemployment rate (ranging between 35 and 40%), brain-drain outmigration, and ethnic cantonments. I contrast these realities of 2001 because these circumstances – a flourishing economy at the expense of the traumatized population – ought to be seen as part of a trauma economy. The trauma economy, in other words, extends far beyond the purview of the Western media networks. In discussing the way traumatic memories travel along the circuits of the global media, I have described only a few of the many processes that transform traumatic events into fungible traumatic memories; each stage of that process represents an exchange that progressively reinterprets the memory, giving it a new value. Media outlets seek to frame the trauma of the Bosnian wars in ways that are consistent with the aims of pre-existing political or economic agendas; we see this in Sacco just as easily as in Ugresic’s assessment of how even a putatively liberal state like the Netherlands will necessarily inflect the value of one trauma over another. The point is that in this circulation, trauma is placed in a marketplace; the siege of Sarajevo, where an unscrupulous fixer can supply western reporters with the story they want to hear is only a concentrated example of a more general phenomenon. Traumatic memories are always in circulation, being revalued in each transaction according to the logic of supply and demand. Victim and witness; witness and reporter; reporter and audience; producer and consumer: all these parties bargain to suit their different interests. The sooner we acknowledge the influence of these interests, the closer we will come to an understanding of how trauma travels.

## 3

#### Desire creates the illusion of the self and the suffering that defines the human condition. Our only capacity is thus to affirm the extermination of this desire in the face of perpetual death and an impermanent reality

**DOLLIMORE 1998** (Jonathan Dollimore 1998 (Death, Desire and Loss in Western Culture, p 54-56.)

Siddhartha Gautama (560-477 BC) was a prince who, because of his high privilege, encountered suffering and death relatively late in life. Legend tells us that when he did eventually encounter them the trauma was the greater, and changed his life: he became Buddha, the Enlightened One. In the religion he founded, life is experienced as a permanent intrinsic unsatisfactoriness manifested as suffering (dukkha) and pain: birth is painful, old age is painful, sickness is painful, death is painful, sorrow, lamentation, dejection, and despair are painful. Contact with unpleasant things is painful, not getting what one wishes is painful. In short the five groups of grasping [the elements, skandbasy which make up a person] are painful. ('Sermon at Benares', in Burtt, p. 30) Everything about life involves suffering and dissatisfaction, a sense of lack. If we strive to overcome that lack we fail, and suffering becomes marked by a renewed craving, now intensified by an acute sense of loss. Suffering derives directly from the fact that everything that exists is radically mutable. In particular, happiness, if it is achieved, cannot last. Suffering haunts happiness from the outside and the inside. Where Buddhism differs from Western religions is in the full acceptance of mutability; happiness lies in achieving that acceptance. Suffering is perpetuated by, and inseparable from, ignorance, and mitigated by wisdom. The deepest ignorance is to fail to see, or to disavow, the fact that everything that exists is mutable and transient. The force of this position may be seen, again, in contrast with Christianity; for the Buddhist the source of suffering is ignorance rather than sin. And the real source of suffering is desire (kama) or craving (tanha, literally 'thirst'), both of which are intrinsic to, constitutive of, humankind. There is a Buddhist doctrine of 'conditioned arising' or 'dependent origination' which asserts that everything that exists is dependent on certain prevailing conditions; nothing is intrinsically self-sufficient, independent or stable. This is especially true of selfhood. Buddhism completely denies the idea of a transcendent or autonomous self so powerful in Western religion and philosophy. To believe that there is some essential inner self or consciousness which is the real me, ultimately identifiable apart from everything that happens to me, is an illusion: What we call a personality is just an individual stream of becoming; a cross-section of it at any given moment in an aggregate of the five skandhas which (as long as it continues) are in unstable and unceasing interaction with each other, (p. 86) There is no I. Even to believe in an I which possesses emotions (albeit helplessly) is mistaken. One of the problems with desire, and why it cannot make us happy, is that it presupposes a self which does not exist; at the core of our being we are empty. Everything that constitutes the individual is marked by the unsatisfactoriness and suffering which is dukkha. Nor is there such a thing as the soul. The person is only a fleeting series of discontinuous states held together by desire, by craving. When desire is extinguished the person is dissolved. Since life and suffering are synonymous, the extinction of desire is the goal of human endeavor. Until that happens we continue to exist through a series of rebirths. It is not death as such which is deplored, but rebirth; it is not death but rebirth which we must escape. So much so that in some early texts rebirth is described as 'redeath'. Desire perpetuates life, which is synonymous with suffering, and which leads to death. Desire perpetuates death; it keeps one dying. The self is merged with ultimate reality not by identifying the core of the self (soul/essence) with ultimate reality (God/the universal) but by extinguishing self into non-being (nirvana). This is the aspect of Buddhism which has fascinated Western philosophers like Schopenhauer and artists like Wagner; with whatever degree of misinterpretation, they have been drawn by the ideas of empowerment through renunciation, nullification and quiescence; of the apparent ability to move freely with the mutability and change which arc the apparent cause of suffering; of choosing freely not to pursue the illusion of freedom, in a sense to eliminate the illusion of self; of becoming discontinuous, mindless. Not to escape mutability but to become it; not to just go with the flow of endless change, but to become it. To achieve the state of nirvana - that is, a state of being which is essentially empty of desire and striving. The wisdom of Buddhism does not desire to transcend change or to affirm an essential ultimate relationship of self to the absolute and unchanging (Platonic forms, the Christian God); nor does the Buddhist desire to die or to cease to be (the death drive): he or she does not desire annihilation but rather learns how to cease desiring. Nirvana is the utter cessation of desire or craving; it means extinction.

#### Just as Don Quixote fought windmills, the aff team is the spectre of Western crazies. Desire creates suffering, which motivates imaginary enemies and is the root cause of all wars.

**Khema 1994** (Ayya Khema 1994 Buddhist monk, “All of us beset by Birth, Decay, and Death.” Buddhism Today, [http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/003-allofus-5.htm)\](http://www.buddhismtoday.com/english/philosophy/thera/003-allofus-5.htm%29%5C)

If you have ever read Don Quixote, you'll remember that he was fighting windmills. Everybody is doing just that, fighting windmills. Don Quixote was the figment of a writer's imagination, a man who believed himself to be a great warrior. He thought that every windmill he met was an enemy and started battling with it. That's exactly what we are doing within our own hearts and that's why this story has such an everlasting appeal. It tells us about ourselves. Writers and poets who have survived their own lifetimes have always told human beings about themselves. Mostly people don't listen, because it doesn't help when somebody else tells us what's wrong with us and few care to hear it. One has to find out for oneself and most people don't want to do that either. What does it really mean to fight windmills? It means fighting nothing important or real, just imaginary enemies and battles. All quite trifling matters, which we build into something solid and formidable in our minds. We say: "I can't stand that," so we start fighting, and "I don't like him," and a battle ensues, and "I feel so unhappy," and the inner war is raging. We hardly ever know what we're so unhappy about. The weather, the food, the people, the work, the leisure, the country, anything at all will usually do. Why does this happen to us? Because of the resistance to actually letting go and becoming what we really are, namely nothing. Nobody cares to be that. Everybody wants to be something or somebody even if it's only Don Quixote fighting windmills. Somebody who knows and acts and will become something else, someone who has certain attributes, views, opinions and ideas. Even patently wrong views are held onto tightly, because it makes the "me" more solid. It seems negative and depressing to be nobody and have nothing. We have to find out for ourselves that it is the most exhilarating and liberating feeling we can ever have. But because we fear that windmills might attack, we don't want to let go. Why can't we have peace in the world? Because nobody wants to disarm. Not a single country is ready to sign a disarmament pact, which all of us bemoan. But have we ever looked to see whether we, ourselves, have actually disarmed? When we haven't done so, why wonder that nobody else is ready for it either? Nobody wants to be the first one without weapons; others might win. Does it really matter? If there is nobody there, who can be conquered? How can there be a victory over nobody? Let those who fight win every war, all that matters is to have peace in one's own heart. As long as we are resisting and rejecting and continue to find all sorts of rational excuses to keep on doing that there has to be warfare. War manifests externally in violence, aggression and killing. But how does it reveal itself internally? We have an arsenal within us, not of guns and atomic bombs, but having the same effect. And the one who gets hurt is always the one who is shooting, namely oneself. Sometimes another person comes within firing range and if he or she isn't careful enough, he or she is wounded. That's a regrettable accident. The main blasts are the bombs which go off in one's own heart. Where they are detonated, that's the disaster area. The arsenal which we carry around within ourselves consists of our ill will and anger, our desires and cravings. The only criterion is that we don't feel peaceful inside. We need not believe in anything, we can just find out whether there is peace and joy in our heart. If they are lacking, most people try to find them outside of themselves. That's how all wars start. It is always the other country's fault and if one can't find anyone to blame then one needs more "Lebensraum," more room for expansion, more territorial sovereignty. In personal terms, one needs more entertainment, more pleasure, more comfort, more distractions for the mind. If one can't find anyone else to blame for one's lack of peace, then one believes it to be an unfulfilled need. Who is that person, who needs more? A figment of our own imagination, fighting windmills. That "more" is never ending. One can go from country to country, from person to person. There are billions of people on this globe; it's hardly likely that we will want to see every one of them, or even one-hundredth, a lifetime wouldn't be enough to do so. We may choose twenty or thirty people and then go from one to the next and back again, moving from one activity to another, from one idea to another. We are fighting against our own dukkha and don't want to admit that the windmills in our heart are self-generated. We believe somebody put them up against us, and by moving we can escape from them. Few people come to the final conclusion that these windmills are imaginary, that one can remove them by not endowing them with strength and importance. That we can open our hearts without fear and gently, gradually let go of our preconceived notions and opinions, views and ideas, suppressions and conditioned responses. When all that is removed, what does one have left? A large, open space, which one can fill with whatever one likes. If one has good sense, one will fill it with love, compassion and equanimity. Then there is nothing left to fight. Only joy and peacefulness remain, which cannot be found outside of oneself. It is quite impossible to take anything from outside and put it into oneself. There is no opening in us through which peace can enter. We have to start within and work outward. Unless that becomes clear to us, we will always find another crusade.

#### Lastly – The Middle Path

#### A rejection of the cycle of desire allows us to have enlightened engagement with the world

**DAVIS 2004** (Bret W. Davis, 2004 (Department of Japanese Philosophy Kyoto University “Zen After Zarathustra: The Problem of the Will in the Confrontation Between Nietzsche and Buddhism” The Journal of Nietzsche Studies 28 (2004) 89-138, accessed through muse.edu)

The Vimalakirti Sutra tells us that the Buddha Lands are not somewhere else, but rather "the various kinds of living beings are themselves the Buddha Lands of the Bodhisattvas"; it is only that these beings do not yet see the purity of this world due to the impurity of their way of seeing.24 In learning to see that "form is none other than emptiness" and that "emptiness does not represent the extinction of form," one ceases to "yearn for nirvana" and to "loath this world," and is able to "enter the gate of nondualism."25 Nagarjuna tersely asserts this doctrine of nondualism when he writes: "The limits (i.e., realm) of nirvana are the limits [End Page 97] of samsara. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever."26 Jay Garfield gives the following helpful interpretation of these enigmatic yet crucial lines. "To be in samsara is to see things as they appear to deluded consciousness and to interact with them accordingly. To be in nirvana, then, is to see those things as they are—as merely empty, dependent, impermanent, and nonsubstantial, but not to be somewhere else, seeing something else.... Nagarjuna is emphasizing that nirvana is not someplace else. It is a way of being here."27 The way things are here and now, according to Buddhism, is neither existence nor non-existence, but rather the middle way of dependent co-origination. When this dynamic process of interconnected becoming is radically thought through, according to Nagarjuna, there is no (substantial) "thing" that comes into and goes out of existence. And this means that each and every phenomenal event is marked by—in the words of his famous eightfold negation—"non-origination, non-extinction; non-destruction, non-permanence; non-identity, non-differentiation; non-coming (into being), non-going (out of being)."28 The "uncompounded" is thus not someplace else, but is this world of non-substantial becoming seen aright. According to Nagarjuna, the root of samsaric existence is the activity or disposition (Sk. samskâra) that compounds phenomena into reified forms, forms that we attach ourselves to and then suffer the loss (of control) of. The "wise one" who sees into this vicious circle, therefore, ceases to "act" in the sense of "to create compounds." But this cessation is presumably not a cessation of all "activity" as such; indeed, as Garfield puts it, by ceasing the activity of reification "we can achieve... a nirvana not found in an escape from the world but in an enlightened and awakened engagement with it."29 The right effort to attain nirvana is thus not a will to nothingness, but leads rather to the realization that there is nothing to "attain."30 Thus asamskrta refers not to an eternal realm outside the conditioned world of becoming, but to a more originary way of perceiving and dwelling in the world of dependent co-origination. This nondualism of samsara and nirvana, however, is not a simple identity. It is neither a dualism (since nirvana is not some other place outside this world), nor is it a sheer nothingness, a negation of existence as such. Yet the world reaffirmed is not simply the same as the initial world of "attachment" (P./Sk. upâdâna). Rather, nirvana implies a different way of being-in-this-world. Yet how can we characterize this difference? Negatively speaking, we may assume that enlightened action would not be driven by attachment, craving, or, presumably, the will to power. In following the return movement in Buddhism back toward a reaffirmative characterization of being-in-the-world, we must not loose sight of the importance of this initial moment of negation. The negation of these modes of "willful" being-in-the-world marks the radical difference between an enlightened "re-affirmation" and an ignorant craving for and attachment to life. Nirvana, as a "blowing out of the flame of craving and attachment," demands first of all a radical negation of the will. A reaffirmation of the world of activity [End Page 98] is made possible, however, only by way of a second—equally necessary—negation, namely, a negation of any sublated craving for and attachment to transcendent repose in the realm of nirvana. The event of nirvana thus paradoxically completes itself only in a movement through its own negation. Saigusa Mitsuyoshi writes that this dialectical movement toward reaffirmation through double negation can already be found in the early sutras. The Suttanipâta, for instance, often instructs us not only to discard "this world," but also to discard "that world" of the beyond. Saigusa interprets the first negation to signify the "negative" moment of nirvana, the "going forth" (Jp. ôsô) from this world of craving and ignorance, and the second negation to indicate a "positive" moment of "returning" (Jp. gensô) to compassionate activity within the world of conditioned existence. This movement of return, he adds, is not that of a one-dimensional circle, but rather that of a three-dimensional spiral.31 This dynamic dialectic of reaffirmation through double negation is clearly developed in the Mahayana tradition, as succinctly stated in the key phrase of the Heart Sutra: "form is emptiness; emptiness is form." Phenomenal beings (forms; Sk. rûpa) are emptied of any reified substantial essence (Sk. svabhâva); yet emptiness essentially empties itself into and as the eventful suchness of phenomenal be-ings in their dependent co-origination.

# 2nc

## framework

### dialogue

#### It turns the case—a stasis point is the necessary precondition for examining any issue

Hanghoj 8

http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

 Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008

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professor.

According to Eugene Matusov, classroom examples of authoritative discourse also include “intolerance, speaking for others, an unwillingness to listen to and genuinely question others, the failure to test one’s own ideas and assumptions, and the desire to impose one’s own views on others” (Matusov, 2007: 231). Internally persuasive discourse, in contrast, refers to language use directed towards mutual communication and the mutual construction of knowledge: “In the everyday rounds of our consciousness, the internally persuasive word is half-ours and halfsomeone- else's” (Bakhtin, 1981: 345). In this way, internally persuasive discourse marks a creative border zone based on the impossibility of any word ever being final, and for this reason it is “able to reveal ever newer ways to mean” (Bakhtin, 1981: 346). But internally persuasive discourse cannot be reduced to the mere “appropriation” of the ideas and words of others, as it requires the ability to be involved in and embody how “diverse voices collide with each other in a dialogue that tests these ideas” (Matusov, 2007: 230). Thus, internally persuasive discourse always requires some form of dialogical and critical exposure that can be supported by the interplay of different voices in a classroom setting. The application of Bakhtin’s terms to classroom contexts can be quite problematic as the two terms easily end up as an unproductive dichotomy between authoritative (“bad”) and persuasive (“good”) discourse. Bakhtin scholar Gary Saul Morson has tried to further elaborate the two concepts and argues that internally persuasive discourse cannot be sustained in a classroom without authority (Morson, 2004).21 Quite simply, it is impossible to create shared classroom attention solely on the basis of internally persuasive discourse.

### At: education

No impact turns to our education—dialogic debate facilitates education; it doesn’t prescribe any outcome

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<https://eric.exeter.ac.uk/repository/bitstream/handle/10036/41533/Towards%20a%20Dialogic%20Understanding.pdf?sequence=1>

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Conclusions The teaching and learning of general thinking skills, especially creativity and learning to learn, is hard to understand through a neo-Vygotskian perspective which focuses on the use of tools for the social construction of knowledge. Understanding is an event within a dialogue between perspectives and is not reducible to a constructed representation. A focus on tools and construction cannot explain creative insights and is hard to convert into a pedagogy for teaching general thinking skills since tools are always specific to tasks. Teaching thinking is much easier to understand through a dialogic perspective which focuses on the opening, deepening and broadening of reflective spaces. What is missing from the neo-Vygotskian account is the importance of the implicit space of possibilities opened up by dialogue which allows for creative emergence and which is the irreducible context for the interpretations of signs and representations. This dialogic interpretative framework implies the need for a pedagogy of teaching dialogic, that is the ability to sustain more than one perspective simultaneously, as an end in itself and as the primary thinking skill upon which all other thinking skills are derivative. This pedagogy can be described in terms of moving learners into the space of dialogue. Tools, including language and computer environments, can be used for opening up and maintaining dialogic spaces and for deepening and broadening dialogic spaces. In many cases the pedagogic practices that follows from this dialogic interpretative framework are already happening, this includes the promotion of communities of enquiry and dialogue skills, the use of forums of alternative voices to induct students into debate, engagement in real dialogues across cultural and geographic differences using the internet. scaffolding induction into such dialogues using synchronous and asynchronous environments, amongst others. The purpose of the dialogic framework for CSCL is therefore not necessarily suggesting new pedagogical strategies but rather in providing an interpretative framework that can be applied retrospectively to pedagogical practices that have emerged through the intuition of practitioners in a way that reveals what is of real value in these practices and so can serve as a basis for future design.

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Orly Lobel, University of San Diego Assistant Professor of Law, 2007, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics,” 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/lobel.pdf

V. RESTORING CRITICAL OPTIMISM IN THE LEGAL FIELD

“La critique est aisée; l’art difficile.”

A critique of cooptation often takes an uneasy path. Critique has always been and remains not simply an intellectual exercise but a political and moral act. The question we must constantly pose is how critical accounts of social reform models contribute to our ability to produce scholarship and action that will be constructive. To critique the ability of law to produce social change is inevitably to raise the question of alternatives. In and of itself, the exploration of the limits of law and the search for new possibilities is an insightful field of inquiry. However, the contemporary message that emerges from critical legal consciousness analysis has often resulted in the distortion of the critical arguments themselves. This distortion denies the potential of legal change in order to illuminate what has yet to be achieved or even imagined. Most importantly, cooptation analysis is not unique to legal reform but can be extended to any process of social action and engagement. When claims of legal cooptation are compared to possible alternative forms of activism, the false necessity embedded in the contemporary story emerges — a story that privileges informal extralegal forms as transformative while assuming that a conservative tilt exists in formal legal paths. In the triangular conundrum of “law and social change,” law is regularly the first to be questioned, deconstructed, and then critically dismissed. The other two components of the equation — social and change — are often presumed to be immutable and unambiguous. Understanding the limits of legal change reveals the dangers of absolute reliance on one system and the need, in any effort for social reform, to contextualize the discourse, to avoid evasive, open-ended slogans, and to develop greater sensitivity to indirect effects and multiple courses of action. **Despite its weaknesses, however, law is an optimistic discipline**. It operates both in the present and in the future. **Order without law is often the privilege of the strong**. Marginalized groups have used legal reform precisely because they lacked power. Despite limitations, these groups have often successfully secured their interests through legislative and judicial victories. **Rather than experiencing a** disabling disenchantment **with the legal system, we can learn from both the successes and failures of past models, with the aim of** constantly redefining the boundaries of legal reform **and making visible law’s broad reach**.

#### The process of inculcating critical thinking is more transformative than their [demand / ethical stance]

Catherine Fox, teaches writing at Iowa State University. Her research interests focus on feminist and critical pedagogies, critical race theory, and feminist rhetorics, 2002, The Race to Truth: Disarticulating Critical Thinking from Whiteliness, Pedagogy 2.2 (2002) 197-212

We also tend to acknowledge critical thinking only as an analytic form of thought that "resists" the status quo. David Wallace and Helen Rothschild Ewald (2000: 21) point out that cultural critique is often the primary goal of feminist and critical pedagogies. "**Privileging resistance can itself become an expression of a teacher's absolute authority**," however, **and is antithetical to our goal of transforming relations of power and authority**. In feminist and critical pedagogies, resistance to the status quo becomes the answer that students are expected to arrive at after analyzing texts. For example, Shor (1992: 41) presents critical thinking as follows: Had I tried to be a "neutral" teacher who ignored the pro-business bias of news organizations, I would have cheated students of a chance for critical thinking about the real world they live in. For a teacher or syllabus to ignore business bias would have been just as political in orientation and less scientific; that would have meant avoiding the criticism of the way power actually operates in the media to create manipulative images of the world. . . . A syllabus without critical questions is not neutral or apolitical. In fact, it supports the status quo by not questioning it. . . . Students in the media class gained a critical perspective on their TV, radio, and daily papers. . . . When I posed [the antilabor tilt in these media] as a problem, they had a chance to see one structure in society for what it really is [emphasis mine]. I agree that no classroom is "neutral," and I do not deny the pro-business bias of the media, but I struggle with Shor's construing of critical thinking (which is fairly typical for the literature on alternative pedagogies). In the problem-posing approach to teaching, which relies on critical thinking as the primary tool for finding solutions, the instructor too often has already solved the problem. In my own composition classrooms, some students seem to equate critical thinking with figuring out what my opinion is and then reproduce it in their papers and class comments. I have told them that I do not expect them to agree with me; I simply want them to think critically. But in reflecting on the comments I put on their papers and the ways that I lead class discussions, I become uneasy, because my comments, which are intended to encourage critical thinking, often point to my unintentional use of it to guide my students to the "right" answer, the "right" perspective—which is always my answer, [End Page 200] my perspective. My experiences as a feminist educator and my review of the literature indicate that, too often, the "chance for critical thinking" means the chance finally to know the "truth."Rather than "an analytic and imaginative habit of mind**," critical thinking** comes to mean seeing from and believing in the feminist or critical **instructor's perspective** on the manipulative powers that serve the status quo. In this way critical thinking, however "revolutionary," is "still running in old cycles." 3 In sum, I perceive the following problems with the way that feminist and critical pedagogues posit critical thinking: 1. In general, we consider it an unquestionable good, and as such it operates as a god-term. 2. We equate it with analytic thinking that leads students to see issues in the "right" way. 3. Thus we tend to conflate critical thinking with feminist and critical ideologies. 4. Ultimately, doing so creates a race to truth whose telos is the same as that of the traditional pedagogies criticized for using transmission models of language, knowledge, and learning. Critical Thinking: Racing to Truth One way to disarticulate this conflation is through the metaphor of whiteliness. Ruth Frankenberg (1993, 1997) and Michelle Fine et al. (1997) explore the social construction of whiteliness and offer broad analyses of how it manifests itself (in such realms as history, sociological and cultural studies, subjectivity and the performance of identities, and social movements). Importantly, some scholars argue that studying whiteliness reifies its central position in discussions of race and racism. I believe, however, that naming and defining what has been considered "transparent" are also important steps toward disrupting systems of domination. 4 In "Identity: Skin Blood Heart," in which she explores her struggles against racism and anti-Semitism, Pratt (1984: 14-15) lists four characteristics of the white, southern female identity that she contends with in attempting to live in "connection" with others: "I was taught to be a judge, of moral responsibility and of punishment only in relation to my ethical system; was taught to be a martyr, to take all the responsibility for change, and the glory, to expect others to do nothing; was taught to be a peacemaker, to mediate, negotiate between opposing sides because I knew the right way; was taught to be a preacher, to point out wrongs and tell others what to do." She defines this white identity as a false identity that has taught her to lead her life through [End Page 201] "ought-to's" rather than through the need and desire for social change and connection to other people. 5 Frye (1992: 153) uses Pratt's four characteristics to launch her own discussion of whiteliness. She explains that the white, southern, Christian identity she was taught to espouse was based on the motto "Right is might": "'We' knew right from wrong and had the responsibility to see to it right was done; that there were others who did not know what is right and wrong and should be advised, instructed, helped and directed by us." Frye offers the following "lessons learned" about how to be whitely, all of which pertain primarily to Pratt's characteristic of judge: 6 I was taught that because one knows what is right, it is morally appropriate to have and exercise what I now would call race and class privilege. Whitely people have a staggering faith in their own rightness and goodness, and that of other whitely people. We are not crooks. Whitely people do have a sense of right and wrong, and are ethical. Their ethics is in a great part an ethics of forms, procedures and due process. Whitely people tend to believe that one preserves one's goodness by being principled, by acting according to rules instead of according to feeling. Authority seems to be central to whiteliness, as you might expect from a people who are raised to run things, or to aspire to that: belief in one's authority in matters practical, moral and intellectual exists in tension with the insecurity and hypocrisy that are essentially connected with the pretense of infallibility. (153-54) Turning next to white women's whiteliness, Frye argues that it is based on integrity, dignity, and respectability, which whitely women use as levers to raise themselves to the level of whitely men. She calls on white women to unlearn whiteliness, just as men are expected to unlearn masculinity, if the ultimate goal is to achieve more egalitarian relationships with others. The judgmentalism of whitely people and the presumed rightness that protects them from having to justify their ability to know right from wrong shed light on what is intuitively wrong with conflating critical thinking and a particular political agenda. 7 For example, Elizabeth Ellsworth (1992: 96) characterizes critical thinking as "judging the truth and merit of propositions . . . and the critical [and feminist] pedagogue is one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom." When we teach students how to analyze texts as feminist and critical pedagogues, we often assume that we are being principled, ethical, and morally appropriate because we are following the "rules of reason" [End Page 202] as they have been established during the long history of Western intellectualism. 8 When analyzing and writing about the advertising industry's representation of women in my composition classroom, I often found myself approaching discussions and the evaluation of student papers with the assumption that I had the right analyses of the ads; my job was simply to pose leading questions to my students. If they arrived at my point of view, I rewarded them with oral or written comments that suggested that they had learned to think critically. If they did not arrive, I had such faith in my own rightness and righteousness that I could dismiss them as resisting my pedagogy and therefore as being unreachable. Rather than state my ideological position and goals as a feminist educator explicitly, I seductively named what I did "teaching my students to think critically." One's positioning as a feminist or critical pedagogue, then, rests on the assumption that one has already arrived at the position of being a critical thinker. It follows, since we have attained the right answer or political position, that we have the moral or ethical responsibility of getting our students to do the same. In assuming that critical thinking is a point of arrival and, perhaps more important, in using it to race students to the truths we have discovered, we manifest and reproduce whitely ways of being in the world. Thus critical thinking becomes a lever, similar to the integrity, dignity, and respectability whitely women use to raise themselves to the level of white men. In our classrooms, when we posit critical thinking as the moment of arriving at the right answer, we use it as a lever to raise students to our level. Transformation is supposedly undergone by the nonwhitely students; we instructors are exempt from it. Students who do not arrive at the right answer or resist the idea of the right answer do not get raised; in general, we do not reward their good critical thinking with high grades, favorable evaluations, and our interest in or involvement with them. The students whom we deem good critical thinkers can feel a "staggering faith in their own rightness and goodness and that of other whitely people" and can use their newly honed critical thinking skills to raise nonwhitely people to their level. When we replace dominant worldviews with "alternative" ones, moreover, we use critical thinking to reproduce dichotomous thinking between "us" and "them," between "right" and "wrong." There is nothing radical or transformative about supplanting a conservative, hegemonic truth with a leftist, marginalized truth—it is only more "running in old cycles." The parallels between theories of whiteliness and the uses of critical thinking in alternative pedagogies raise crucial questions for reflection: How much of the critical thinking that we laud in ourselves is embedded in our assumed righteousness, principled conduct, goodness, and standing as moral and ethical citizens and teachers who, because we possess these whitely qualities, have the authority to run things? Does the critical thinking we encourage our students to apply lead them to aspire to the same qualities? **If so, it poses the danger of** reproducing the very hegemony that radical pedagogues aim to disrupt. To the extent that we can name and understand how whiteliness manifests itself in critical thinking and in our ways of being in the world, however, we can begin to transform them into new ways of being. 9 Disarticulating Critical Thinking from Whiteliness Critical thinking, when disarticulated from a particular ideological standpoint, offers us a means of engaging in the self-reflexivity needed to question the truth of our positions. To begin to move away from whiteliness, we might construe critical thinking as a self-reflexive process that is pragmatically oriented, rather than as a right answer or a point of arrival. Kate Ronald and Hephzibah Roskelly (2001: 629), quoting C. S. Peirce, suggest that we link pragmatism with liberatory pedagogy to find fruitful methods of discovering transformative possibilities: "'Grant an idea to be true' . . . then ask 'what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life.'" Adopting the pragmatic insistence that "meaning resides in consequences" (614), we might begin by positing critical thinking as what examines the consequences of our choices and the locations from which we make them, not what suggests the relative correctness of choices and locations. Two concepts from Paulo Freire indicate an approach to critical thinking that supersedes the revolutionary cycles that race to the truth. 10 In Letters to Cristina Freire (1996: 115) explains that critical thinking begins with "epistemological curiosity" and leads to critical consciousness, which enables students to make broad connections between themselves and the social. For Freire, critical thinking involves the ability not only to know and analyze concepts but to imagine things beyond the present reality; students who possess this ability become knowers and doers, creators of the word and the world. In Teachers As Cultural Workers (Shor and Freire 1998: 40), Freire also explains the necessity of humility: "Humility does not flourish in people's insecurities but in the insecure security of the more aware, and thus this insecure security is one of the expressions of humility, as is uncertain certainty, unlike certainty, which is excessively sure of itself." Importantly, humility is not akin to meekness or docility, which has often been demanded of marginalized peoples and so is at odds with the goal of transformation. Hence we must understand the [End Page 204] locations from which we teach and speak; the degree to which we may invoke humility is contingent on the extent to which our positions already carry whitely notions of rightness and righteousness. **Imagination and humility** seem to **go underground when we collapse critical thinking with** feminist and **critical ideologies**. Ann Berthoff (1988: 38) aptly describes the imaginative, critical mind as "fresh and open," as a mind that "opens out" into the arena of the possible. The very idea of possibilities, rather than certainties, might keep our minds and our students' minds fresh and open. If we emphasized critical thinking as an imaginative habit of mind, we might move past moral ought-to's and stop urging our students to race to truths that we have already discovered. We might construe critical thinking, then, not as a way to home in on the truth through rational deliberation but as an inclination to look for multiple solutions and question their consequences. This inclination might lead us back to an attitude of humility, of "uncertain certainty," beyond the whitely notion that through critical thinking we can "judg[e] the truth and merit of propositions" infallibly. That is, if we could question the consequences of our actions, the ways that meaning resides in the consequences of a choice, we might see new ways of being that move past revolution, past replacing old truths with feminist or critical ideological truths, and into moments of transformation, moments in which we engage in constructing meaning and knowledge with our students, rather than transmit knowledge to them. The first-year composition course I teach at Iowa State University, a predominantly white, middle-class institution, encourages students to see writing as a powerful tool for both intellectual life and civic action. In it I use a local conflict or issue, for example, the "education crisis" that Iowa (like many states) is facing, as an occasion to engage in a reconceived kind of critical thinking. 11 Iowa loses teachers to neighboring states because its public schools lack the funding and other incentives to retain the new teachers that the local colleges train. To counteract this loss, a bill now under consideration proposes to secure quality teachers for Iowa's public schools through a new structure of promotion. I begin this project by having the class research the history of education in Iowa, identify what incentives draw its new teachers to other states, and investigate the solutions that citizens and legislators have recommended to stem the loss. The focus of this project then turns to a specific solution, such as the education bill. To learn about its consequences, my students may interview professors and students in the College of Education for their perspectives or local schoolteachers (both new and experienced) for the opinions of the citizens whom the bill would affect most directly. After [End Page 205] gaining these multilayered perspectives (and thus avoiding a single "truth" handed down from the teacher's position of authority), we formulate our own stances toward the bill. Finally, in keeping with the course's objectives, we choose some way to enter the conflict. I give the students various options for doing so, such as creating a Web page that helps educate citizens about the bill, assembling a brochure that takes a stand on it, or writing a letter to the editor or to a congressional representative. Toward the end of the project, we discuss the consequences of the options we have chosen; we also question the project itself and the choices I made in designing it. Certainly, the focus on working within institutionalized structures, such as the legal system, proceeds from trust in the authority and rules of preestablished systems of negotiation; hence the activities that I offer my students in this project move their thinking in a particular direction. I place my own choices on the table for discussion to model a pragmatic process of critical examination that asks: What difference do my choices make? What options do they preclude or open? Examining **many perspectives**, then, is vital to the critical thinking I want to promote, but so is questioning one's own stake in a particular position or solution, because it is where reflection and humility enter the process. One of the best ways I have found to encourage these habits is continually to ask students to think about their thinking, to consider why they think what they do about the conflict under investigation. To distance students from the component of whiteliness that judges only in relation to one ethical system, I often ask them: What do you stand to lose if you give up that belief or position or to gain if you hold on to it? The point is to engage them in a self-reflexivity that might forestall the collapsing of critical thinking with the whitely tendency to judge from a position of presumptive rightness and righteousness. Moreover, the teacher must become a coparticipant in the making of meaning so as to model critical thinking that resists the whitely feminist and critical assumption of having already arrived at the truth, at the position of "criticality." In a workshop at the Learning Community Institute at Iowa State, Jean MacGregor (2001) described an interdisciplinary project created through linked-learning community classes (in composition and environmental science) that struck me as a useful example of how critical thinking can be pragmatically reenvisioned in feminist and critical classrooms. The project centers on the local conflict over the Cushman Dam, which provides electricity for the city of Tacoma, Washington, but is threatening the local salmon population, whose migratory route it blocks. MacGregor's students research the various sides of the conflict and decide whether the dam should remain in place [End Page 206] or be torn down. In papers they then address the consequences: if they argue that the dam should be destroyed, they must suggest alternative sources of electricity; if they decide that the dam should be kept, they must find a way to save the dwindling salmon population. Asking students to reflect on the effects of their choices embraces the pragmatism that Ronald and Roskelly (2001) suggest might make transformation possible, because it moves us away from the dogmatism of feminist and critical discourse. It also positions us to question the truths that we forward. Confronting Closure and Embracing Uncertain Certainty Notwithstanding the examples above, it remains possible for critical thinking to be posited in whitely ways. For example, feminist and critical teachers have clear opinions about education; therefore it can be difficult for us not to posit the "right" answers when discussing conflicts that relate to education. It takes active commitment to move away from the assumption that we who have invested our lives in practicing and theorizing about learning already know the truth about the education crisis or the specific issues of an education bill. Where I know that I have strong vested interests, I make a concerted effort to model for my students the reflection, humility, and imagination that I have suggested we need to incorporate into critical thinking. Yet no matter how carefully I do so, **I** still **struggle against an** ideology **of critical thinking that gives priority to social involvement and social responsibility**. From one angle I perceive a set of moral ought-to's in how I have **construe**d critical thinking in the above projects. For example, my definition of it assumes that humility is an admirable trait. For students who have been institutionally and socially constructed to be humble, or who are already unsure of their ability to make meaning and arrive at solutions, the emphasis on questioning can further undermine the ability to claim and voice an opinion in a conflict. These projects also presuppose that change is necessary and that good citizens are those who participate in the democratic process, assumptions that may run counter to students' understanding of democracy and even of the purposes of a college education. For example, MacGregor's project enforces the idea of disrupting the status quo, which not all students hold as a requirement of citizenship. Instructors will always bring to the classroom ideologies that drive our pedagogical choices. However, if we are committed to questioning the conflation of critical thinking with **one ideological stance** and to positing critical thinking as a pragmatic process of knowing, acting, being, and reflecting, we may begin to **move from revolutionary cycles to spaces of transformation**. [End Page 207] How do we deal with students who do not share our ideological assumptions? First, we can avoid summarily dismissing them as simply resistant to our agenda or our pedagogy. Second, we can find methods of using their dissonance to model critical thinking in ways that match our transformative goals. Redefining critical thinking as a recursive engagement in inquiry and then thinking about our thinking represent, for me, moves away from closure and toward the opening of the mind and imagination. **We might model this process by** opening a **dialogue** with our students about the structure of a class or the design of a project in order to explain our pedagogical choices to them. But simply explaining and justifying these choices would reify our authority and power to run things. Rather, we might invite students into a reflective consideration in which to show us some of the consequences of our choices in designing the course. The point of inviting students to do so is to show them that we are genuinely interested in these consequences and to enable students to collaborate in the development, or even the reconstruction, of the project or course. Indeed, I once stopped a project in midsemester when it was apparent that it was not working. In an evaluation I asked the students anonymously to describe the project's strengths and weaknesses and suggest how to reconfigure the remainder of the project and semester. I then presented their responses to the whole class as a starting point. Throughout this process I attempted to model explicitly the critical engagement central to my course curriculum. I realize that I am placing a tall order for feminist and critical educators to fill in one semester or one quarter. Nonetheless, I believe that it will allow us actually to engage in processes of critical thinking alongside our students. In Freire's (1996: 3) words, we need to be "rigorously coherent so as to not lose [ourselves] in the enormous distance between what [we] do and say." My point is not that we should rid our classrooms of truths or ideologies. In fact, we cannot do so, because our agenda is to teach something. However, we can ask for what purpose we posit critical thinking in our classrooms. If we do it in the service of our truth, we must recognize that there is nothing inherently liberatory about any ideological stance, **no matter what the supposed emancipatory goals**. We also can unlearn whitely ways of being in the world; we can disarticulate a whitely construction of critical thinking from feminist and critical ideologies by being more reflective and humble about ourselves as critical thinkers. Not only do we need to represent critical thinking differently to our students, but we need to model it for them if we are to transform the processes of learning and teaching. This modeling requires, in part, more mutual engagement with students in making and reflecting on [End Page 208] meanings. Rather than race students to the truths that we have already figured out, rather than reproduce whitely ways of being, we might begin to construe critical thinking as a process that we engage in with our students. That is, we might see critical thinking as a different approach to learning and teaching: not a specific point of arrival, not a specific form of content, but a cycle in which together we make meaning, arrive at solutions, question the consequences, and return again to making meaning.

#### That proves that process comes before product—inscribing a set ethical outcome at the outset destroys agency

Race and Pedagogy Project, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2005, Jay, Gregory and Gerald Graff. “A Critique of Critical Pedagogy”, http://bit.ly/11e8uXY

Jay and Graff argue that **critical pedagogy is problematic** because it claims to liberate students but in fact only reinforces the “banking” dynamic by forcing progressive ideologies upon students, enforcing a predetermined outcome based upon an assumed true position on the part of the teacher. Oppositional pedagogy makes the same mistake. Instead, the authors recommend a method of “teaching the conflicts,” where the unilateral teacher’s authority in the classroom is balanced by a “counterauthority,” thus opening the possibility for multiple points of view, all of which are laid open to critique. Suggestions for practical application follow. Freire’s close adherence to the Marxian-Hegelian master-slave dialectic, in which all desire on the part of the oppressed is inevitably formed by the oppressor, suffers from a double bind, giving power only to the “liberatory” teacher, who must impose liberation upon the oppressed, freeing them from false consciousness by persuading them of his (tacitly correct) point of view. In other words, **only students persuaded to the radical point of view of the teacher can be expressing an authentic desire**. “This assumption spares Freire from ever having to consider an unpleasant possibility: that what ‘the people’ authentically prefer might conflict with the pedagogy of the oppressed. The assumption is that, deep down, in our most authentic selves, we are all Christian or existentialist Marxists. According to Freire’s model, the resistance of students to the pedagogy of the oppressed would be taken seriously only as a symptom of their woefully mystified consciousness. The teacher would treat their ideas as the suspect products of their political unconscious, not as arguments that might have their own rationality, persuasiveness, and basis in experience. Needless to say, the possibility never arises that the radical teacher might have his or her mind seriously challenged by the conservative student.” (203) The authors are careful to state that they are both progressives themselves; their **opposition to critical pedagogy rises not from a desire to maintain conservative systems, but rather to avoid the** reinscription of oppression **that** they believe **critical** and oppositional **pedagogies promote by silencing and denying authentic agency to the student who has an alternative point of view**. “The failure to take seriously the objections of the unpersuaded seems to us a serious limitation of critical pedagogy both on ethical and strategic grounds.” (204) The authors further attack critical pedagogy by noting a contextual problem: “Freire’s assumption of a student body that will readily accept a description of themselves as the oppressed is understandable in the original context of Freire’s work with Latin American peasants. But Freire’s model encounters serious problems when it is transplanted to a North American campus, where not all students are obviously members of an oppressed class, and where even many of those who might plausibly fit that designation refuse to accept it.” (204) And later, “In our view, the definition of categories such as the disenfranchised and the dominant, oppressed and oppressor, should be a product of the pedagogical process, not its unquestioned premise.” (207) In contrast, “teaching the conflicts” allows for the autonomy and freedom of the subject through the building of discourse communities which go outside the tacit authority of the teacher, and even outside of the traditional boundaries of the classroom. “To be sure, there is a useful place for the ‘collaborative learning’ strategy of decentering authority by breaking the class into small groups. To decenter authority in a fully useful way, however, and transcend the double bind of radical pedagogy, our classrooms need not just to diffuse authority, but to introduce counterauthorities. And this for us means moving beyond the limitations of the isolated course, a model that unwittingly echoes the myth of the unified subject.” (210) **Students should be** presented with multiple viewpoints in any given classroom **and invited to support or contest all of them**. This does not remove politics from the classroom**, but** in fact **makes it truly possible.** “**Real political** opposition and **change** cannot be accomplished by isolated individuals or random acts of critique. Unlike critique, politics is a social enterprise. It requires that persons form communities based on some degree of trust and faith and. mutual respect – even for those with whom one is ideologically at odds.” (208)

### T version

#### Their method is compatible and enhanced by engagement with the topic—the question is which forms of knowledge we use, which means T version of the aff solves.

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

How do we fight against power on this view? Not by trying to escape it (as if liberation consisted in standing outside power altogether), but rather, by turning power(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of power against others. Similarly, how do we fight against established and official forms of knowledge when they are oppressive? Not by trying to escape knowledge altogether, but rather, by turning knowledge(s) against itself(themselves), or by mobilizing some forms of knowledge against others. The critical battle against the monopolization of knowledge-producing practices involves what Foucault calls ‚an insurrection of subjugated knowledges.‛ When it comes to knowledge of the past and the power associated with it, this battle involves resisting the ‚omissions‛ and distortions of official histories, returning to lost voices and forgotten experiences, relating to the past from the perspective of the present in an alternative (out-of-the-mainstream) way. And this is precisely what the Foucaultian notions of ‚counter-history‛ and ‚counter-memory‛ offer.

#### **It’s empirically effective and doesn’t cause cooption**

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

Different experiential and agential standpoints can make different contributions to genealogical investigations and even offer alternative genealogical histories. Given the right socio-political conditions, the critical reconstruction and reevaluation of our beliefs can (and should) be reopened and resumed whenever new standpoints appear on the scene, but also whenever we discover that certain voices or perspectives were never considered or were not given equal weight. Thus it is not surprising that populations feel particularly compelled to reopen the conversation about their past when the socio-political conditions change in such a way that voices and perspectives that had previously been ignored or not fully taken into consideration can now participate differently in the reconstruction of their past because they enjoy a different kind of agency. For example, this has been happening periodically in different ways and on different fronts in the public debates about past dictatorial regimes that have taken place in countries such as Argentina, Chile, or Spain.45 In these countries different publics have demanded a sustained effort to critically revisit the reconstruction of a shared past in the light of evidence, testimony, and articulations or interpretations of facts that challenge established beliefs or are simply not integrated in the collective memory and ‚official history‛ in circulation. There is a plurality of lived pasts and of knowledges about the past that resist unification and create friction. But what are we to make of this resistance and friction? Pluralistic views of truth and knowledge make productive use of those forms of epistemic friction and resistance, whereas monistic views regard epistemic diversity always as a problem. I will restrict myself here to pluralistic views, but I want to emphasize that different kinds of epistemic pluralism involve different normative attitudes with respect to epistemic diversity and the kinds of epistemic friction and resistance that heterogeneous perspectives can exert.

#### Their method is sufficient to avoid cooption combined with a topical action.

Medina, your author, ‘11

Jose, “Toward a Foucaultian Epistemology of Resistance: Counter-Memory, Epistemic Friction, and Guerrilla Pluralism,” http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AnS/philosophy/\_people/faculty\_files/\_medinafoucaultstudies.pdf

On the thoroughly pluralistic view of epistemic agency that we find in the Foucaultian framework, there is an irreducible plurality of centers of experience and agency that function as centers of resistance and contestability. Differently situated discursive subjectivities (or publics) have differential capacities to contest and resist the truths/untruths and the knowledges/ignorances that surround their discursive lives. And insofar as our predecessors are treated as discursive subjects—and not as mere objects to be manipulated at will—we need to take into account their perspectives. Insurrectionary genealogies must take into account the experiences and valuations of past subjects, in which we can find challenges, subversions, and resistances of all sorts. It is there where genealogical investigations draw their critical force. It is in the friction between forgotten and silenced lives and the lives of the present where the insurrections start to happen. Animated by a guerrilla pluralism, Foucaultian genealogies, far from contributing to instrumentalizations and subjugations of the past, are in fact tools for resisting them; their critical power resides precisely in resisting unifications and totalizing perspectives. Genealogical investigations are informed by multiple processes of interpellation with traffic going in all directions. In particular, there are two very different forms of interpellation at play: genealogists interpellate past subjects, but they are also interpellated by subjects of the past. And this double interpellation is something very different from merely treating past subjects as partners in deliberation. It involves more complex (and varied) communicative and normative interrelations. It involves a mutual process of estrangement: we make past lives alien as they also make our own lives strangely unfamiliar. So, in insurrectionary genealogies, far from making ourselves free to remember or forget in whatever way seems most convenient to us, we make ourselves vulnerable to the past by opening our memories to the challenges and contestations of various subjects—the subjects in our present and in our future as well as those in the past—with whom we compare and contrast our discursive perspectives. In genealogical investigations of this sort, the engagement with past subjectivities is mutually transformative: we open ourselves up to interrogation by voices and perspectives hidden in our past, while at the same time we also cast them in a new light that they did not enjoy before the genealogical encounter. Through these critical transformations new connections are brought to light, new possibilities of resistance are activated, and new forms of solidarity become possible. Without losing sight of the specificity of local struggles, without subsuming them under grand movements of liberation, genealogical investigations help us see the interconnections among historically situated forms of subjugation. Through insurrectionary genealogies we can become part of **multiple communities of resistance**— past, present, and future ones—which, without being unified, intersect and overlap in complex ways, creating friction of all sorts. Drawing on the epistemic friction among multiple sources of agency and multiple power/knowledges, insurrectionary genealogies activate counter-memories that make available multiplicitous pasts for differently constituted and positioned subjectivities, making it possible to form plural and heterogeneous forms of solidarity with the past, and opening up new possibilities for social contestation.

#### Our positioning as students is key---acts of resistance in pedagogical spaces like debate are crucial

Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, 21 November 2011, “Occupy Colleges Now: Students as the New Public Intellectuals”, <http://www.truth-out.org/occupy-colleges-now-students-new-public-intellectuals/1321891418>)

Finding our way to a more humane future demands a new politics, a new set of values, and a renewed sense of the fragile nature of democracy. In part, this means educating a new generation of intellectuals who not only defend higher education as a democratic public sphere, but also frame their own agency as intellectuals willing to connect their research, teaching, knowledge, and service with broader democratic concerns over equality, justice, and an alternative vision of what the university might be and what society could become. Under the present circumstances, it is time to remind ourselves that academe may be one of the few public spheres available that can provide the educational conditions for students, faculty, administrators, and community members to embrace pedagogy as a space of dialogue and unmitigated questioning, imagine different futures, become border-crossers, and embrace a language of critique and possibility that makes visible the urgency of a politics necessary to address important social issues and contribute to the quality of public life and the common good. As people move or are pushed by authorities out of their makeshift tent cities in Zuccotti Park and other public spaces in cities across the United States, the harsh registers and interests of the punishing state become more visible. The corporate state cannot fight any longer with ideas because their visions, ideologies and survival of the fittest ethic are bankrupt, fast losing any semblance of legitimacy. Students all over the country are changing the language of politics while reclaiming pedagogy as central to any viable notion of agency, resistance and collective struggle. In short, they have become the new public intellectuals, using their bodies, social media, new digital technologies, and any other viable educational tool to raise new questions, point to new possibilities, and register their criticisms of the various antidemocratic elements of casino capitalism and the emerging punishing state. Increasingly, the Occupy Wall Street protesters are occupying colleges and universities, setting up tents, and using the power of ideas to engage other students, faculty, and anyone else who will listen to them. The call is going out from the University of California at Berkeley, Harvard University, Florida State University, Duke University, Rhode Island College, and over 120 other universities that the time has come to connect knowledge not just to power, but to the very meaning of what it means to be an engaged intellectual responsive to the possibilities of individual and collective resistance and change. This poses a new challenge not only for the brave students mobilizing these protests on college campuses, but also to faculty who often relegate themselves to the secure and comfortable claim that scholarship should be disinterested, objective and removed from politics. There is a great deal these students and young people can learn from this turn away from the so-called professionalism of disinterested knowledge and the disinterested intellectual by reading the works of Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, Jacques Derrida, Howard Zinn, Arundhati Roy, Elaine Scarry, Pierre Bourdieu and others who offer a treasure trove of theoretical and political insights about what it means to assume the role of a public intellectual as both a matter of social responsibility and political urgency. In response to the political indifference and moral coma that embraced many universities and scholars since the 1980s, the late Said argued for intellectuals to move beyond the narrow interests of professionalism and specialization as well as the cheap seductions of celebrity culture being offered to a new breed of publicity and anti-public intellectuals. Said wanted to defend the necessity indeed, keep open the possibility of the intellectual who does not consolidate power, but questions it, connects his or her work to the alleviation of human suffering, enters the public sphere in order to deflate the claims of triumphalism and recalls from exile those dangerous memories that are often repressed or ignored. Of course, such a position is at odds with those intellectuals who have retreated into arcane discourses that offer the cloistered protection of the professional recluse. Making few connections with audiences outside of the academy or to the myriad issues that bear down on everyday lives, many academics became increasingly irrelevant, while humanistic inquiry suffers the aftershocks of flagging public support. The Occupy Wall Street protesters have refused this notion of the deracinated, if not increasingly irrelevant, notion of academics and students as disinterested intellectuals. They are not alone. Refusing the rewards of apolitical professionalism or obscure specialization so rampant on university campuses, Roy has pointed out that intellectuals need to ask themselves some very "uncomfortable questions about our values and traditions, our vision for the future, our responsibilities as citizens, the legitimacy of our 'democratic institutions,' the role of the state, the police, the army, the judiciary, and the intellectual community."[1] Similarly, Scarry points to the difficulty of seeing an injury and injustice, the sense of futility of one's own small efforts, and the special difficulty of lifting complex ideas into the public sphere.[2] Derrida has raised important questions about the relationship between critique and the very nature of the university and the humanities, as when he writes: The university without condition does not, in fact, exist, as we know only too well. Nevertheless, in principle and in conformity with its declared vocation, its professed essence, it should remain an ultimate place of critical resistance and more than critical to all the power of dogmatic and unjust appropriation.[3] Chomsky and the late Zinn have spoken about and demonstrated for over 40 years what it means to think rigorously and act courageously in the face of human suffering and manufactured hardships. All of these theorists are concerned with what it means for intellectuals both within and outside of higher education to embrace the university as a productive site of dialogue and contestation, to imagine it as a site that offers students the promise of a democracy to come, to help them understand that there is no genuine democracy without genuine opposing critical power and the social movements that can make it happen. But there is more at stake here than arguing for a more engaged public role for academics and students, for demanding the urgent need to reconnect humanistic inquiry to important social issues, or for insisting on the necessity for academics to reclaim a notion of ethical advocacy and connective relationships. There is also the challenge of connecting the university with visions that have some hold on the present, defending education as more than an investment opportunity or job credential, students as more than customers, and faculty as more than technicians or a subaltern army of casualized labor. At a time when higher education is increasingly being dominated by a reductive corporate logic and technocratic rationality unable to differentiate training from a critical education, we need a chorus of new voices to emphasize that the humanities, in particular, and the university, in general, should play a central role in keeping critical thought alive while fighting back all attempts to foreclose and pre-empt the further unraveling of human possibilities, prodding human society to go on questioning itself and prevent that questioning from ever stalling or being declared finished. Corporations and the warfare state should not dictate the needs of public and higher education, or, for that matter, any other democratic public sphere. As the Occupy student protesters have pointed out over the last few months, one of the great dangers facing the 21st century is not the risk of illusory hopes, but those undemocratic forces that promote and protect state terrorism, massive inequality, render some populations utterly disposable, imagine the future only in terms of immediate financial gains, and promote forms of self-serving historical reinvention in which power is measured by the degree to which it evades any sense of actual truth and moral responsibility. Students, like their youthful counterparts in the 1960s, are once again arguing that higher education, even in its imperfect state, still holds the promise, if not the reality, of being able to offer them the complex knowledge and interdisciplinary related skills that enable existing and future generations to break the continuity of common sense, come to terms with their own power as critical agents, be critical of the authority that speaks to them, translate private considerations into public issues, and assume the responsibility of not only being governed but learning how to govern. Inhabiting the role of public intellectuals, students can take on the difficult but urgent task of reclaiming the ideal and the practice of what it means to reclaim higher education in general and the humanities, more specifically, as a site of possibility that embraces the idea of democracy not merely as a mode of governance but, most importantlyas journalist Bill Moyers points out as a means of dignifying people so they can become fully free to claim their moral and political agency. Students are starting to recognize that it is crucial to struggle for the university as a democratic public sphere and the need to use that sphere to educate a generation of new students, faculty and others about the history of race, racism, politics, identity, power, the state and the struggle for justice. They are increasingly willing to argue in theoretically insightful and profound ways about what it means to defend the university as a site that opens up and sustains public connections through which people's fragmented, uncertain, incomplete narratives of agency are valued, preserved, and made available for exchange while being related analytically to wider contexts of politics and power. They are moving to reclaim, once again, the humanities as a sphere that is crucial for grounding ethics, justice and morality across existing disciplinary terrains, while raising both a sense of urgency and a set of relevant questions about what kind of education would be suited to the 21st-century university and its global arrangements as part of a larger project of addressing the most urgent issues that face the social and political world. The punishing state can use violence with impunity to eject young people from parks and other public sites, but it is far more difficult to eject them from sites that are designed for their intellectual growth and well-being, make a claim to educate them, and register society's investment and commitment to their future. The police violence that has taken place at the University of California campuses at Berkeley and Davis does more than border on pure thuggery; it also reveals a display of force that is as unnecessary as it is brutal, and it is impossible to justify. These young people are being beaten on their campuses for simply displaying the courage to protest a system that has robbed them of both a quality education and a viable future. But there is more. It is also crucial not to allow casino capitalism to transform higher education into another extension of the corporate and warfare state. If higher education loses its civic purpose and becomes simply an adjunct of corporate and military power, there will be practically no spaces left for dissent, dialogue, civic courage, and a spirit of thoughtfulness and critical engagement. This is all the more reason to occupy colleges and use them as a launching pad to both educate and to expand the very meaning of the public sphere. Knowledge is about more than the truth; it is also a weapon of change. The language of a radical politics needs more than hope and outrage; it needs institutional spaces to produce ideas, values, and social relations capable of fighting off those ideological and material forces of casino capitalism that are intent in sabotaging any viable notion of human interaction, community, solidarity, friendship, and justice. Space is not the ultimate prize here.[4] Politics and ideology are the essence of what this movement should be about. But space becomes invaluable when it its democratic functions and uses are restored. In an age when the media have become a means of mass distraction and entertainment, the university offers a site of informed engagement, a place where theory and action inform each other, and a space that refuses to divorce intellectual activities from matters of politics, social responsibility and social justice. As students and faculty increasingly use the space of the university as a megaphone for a new kind of critical education and politics, it will hopefully reclaim the democratic function of higher education and demonstrate what it means for students, faculty, and others to assume the role of public intellectuals dedicated to creating a formative culture that can provide citizens and others with the knowledge and skills necessary for a radical democracy. Rather than reducing learning to a measurable quantity in the service of a narrow instrumental rationality, learning can take on a new role, becoming central to developing and expanding the capacity for critical modes of agency, new forms of solidarity, and an education in the service of the public good, an expanded imagination, democratic values, and social change. The student intellectual as a public figure merges rigor with civic courage, meaning with the struggle for eliminating injustice wherever it occurs and hope with a realistic notion of social change.

### Solves racism

#### Dialogic democracy is the best way to dismantle racism—our vision of debate is the opposite of exclusion

Gooding-Williams 3

 Race, Multiculturalism and Democracy

Robert Gooding-Wiliams

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 Issue

Constellations

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 I begin with the assumption that fostering the capacity for democratic deliber- ation is a central aim of public education in a democratic society.531 also follow a number of contemporary political theorists in supposing that democratic deliber- ation is a form of public reasoning geared towards adducing considerations that all parties to a given deliberation can find compelling.54 On this view, successful deliberation requires that co-deliberators cultivate a mutual understanding of the differences in conviction that divide them, so that they can formulate reasons (say for implementing or not implementing a proposed policy) that will be generally acceptable despite those differences.55 In the words of one theorist, "[deliberation encourages people with conflicting perspectives to understand each other's point of view, to minimize their moral disagreements, and to search for common ground."56 Lorenzo Simpson usefully glosses the pursuit of mutual understanding when he writes that it requires "a 'reversibility of perspectives,' not in the sense of my collapsing into yon or you into me, but in the sense that I try to understand - but not necessarily agree with - what you take your life to be about and you do the same for me . . . [i]n such a . . . mutual understanding you may come to alter the way in which you understand yourself and I . . . may find that listening to you leads me to alter my self-understanding."57 According to Simpson, the search for common ground need not leave us with the convictions with which we began. On the contrary, the process of democratic deliberation can be a source of self-trans- formation that enriches one's view of the issues at hand and even alters one's conception of the demands of social justice.58 In multicultural America, multicultural public education is a good that promotes mutual understanding across cultural differences, thereby fostering and strengthening citizens' capacities for democratic deliberation. In essence, multi- cultural education is a form of pedagogy whereby students study the histories and cultures of differently cultured fellow citizens, many of whose identities have a composite, multicultural character. More exactly, it is a form of cross-cultural hermeneutical dialogue, and therefore a way of entering into conversation with those histories and cultures.59 By disseminating the cultural capital of cross- cultural knowledge, multicultural education can cultivate citizens' abilities to "reverse perspectives." By facilitating mutual understanding, it can help them to shape shared vocabularies for understanding their moral and cultural identities and for finding common ground in their deliberations.60 By strengthening a student's ability to reverse perspectives, multicultural education may bolster her disposition to engage the self-understandings of differ- ently cultured others, even if the particulars of her multicultural education have not involved an engagement with the cultures of precisely those others (consider, e.g., someone whose multicultural education has included courses in Asian- American literatures, but who knows nothing of American Latino subcultures). Acquiring a know-how and a feel for cross-cultural hermeneutical conversation is likely to **reinforce a student's inclination to understand and learn from the self- interpretations of cultural "others"** in just the way that the cultivation of an athletic skill (e.g., the ability to "head" a soccer ball) tends to reinforce one's inclination to participate in the sports for which having that skill is an advantage (e.g. playing soccer). In the case of multicultural education, one cultivates a skill which is **motivationally conducive** to the sort of mutual understanding that is crit- ical to the flourishing of deliberative democracy in a multicultural society.61 Let me summarize my argument so far. In contrast to Schlesinger. who yearns for a society 111 which the understanding of key political ideals remains immune from deliberative debate animated by cultural and other group differences, I have been suggesting that deliberative debate of this sort is an appropriate medium for seeking and forging common grounds and ideals. I have also been arguing (1) that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America entails a commitment to promoting the mutual understanding of differences through cross-cultural dialogue and (2) that such a commitment justifies the institution of multicultural education. The promotion of mutual understanding avoids Schlesinger's and Asante's kitsch, because it is not predicated off an imperative to preserve an uncomplicated national or ethnic identity in the face of cultural and social complexity. Indeed, the ideal of mutual understanding invites increasing complexity by suggesting that cross-cultural educational insights, since they can effect changes in the self-understandings of persons who have benefitted from a multicultural education, may alter and further complicate those persons' identities, perhaps making them more multicultural. In what follows, I further explore the implications of this ideal by proposing that a commitment to deliberative democracy in multicultural America justifies a form of multicultural education that is, specifically race-conscious.

### At limits bad

Refusing limits is totalitarian – endless criticism will crowd out diversity and radical change

Feldman, Assoc Prof Management Policy – Case Western U, ‘98

(Steven P, “Playing with the Pieces: Deconstruction and the Loss of Moral Culture,” *Journal of Management Studies* Vol. 35 Iss. 1, p. 59-79)

Cultural authority imposes upon its members the awesome dichotomy between a meaningful and a meaningless life (Rieff, 1987). Postmodernists, in scorning cultural authority, are opposing the dynamics of culture. Culture opposes the primacy of possibility -- that is, the ability of man/woman to express everything and therefore nothing. Culture acts through authority to narrow possible meanings. Narrowing meaning is the dynamic of culture. Without this dynamic, culture cannot exist. This is not totalitarian oppression. Totalitarianism operates to destroy meaning in order to annihilate even the possibility of principled resistance. That is what is totalizing about totalitarianism (Arendt, 1950).

Authority, on the contrary, is always given, or it is fraudulent (Rieff, 1985). Authority is given not because people are dupes, tricked into controlling themselves for some systemic conspiracy, but because through the hierarchical ordering of culture they find their way to purposeful behaviour (Durkheim, [1925] 1973) and a feeling of self-respect that makes life meaningful and worthwhile(Cooley, 1922; Rieff, 1985; Sullivan, 1950).

Authority, then, is essential to culture. It protects social life from the primacy of possibility that surrounds every culture. Possibility is the opposite of cultural authority. Cultural diversity cannot be an unlimited goal; its limitation is the central problem of culture (Plato, 1968). No culture can tolerate unlimited diversity without being destroyed. Diversity can only exist inside a culture as a limited range of possibility. Without this 'imaginary wall', individual and social purpose is impossible (Durkheim, [1925] 1973). Deprivation must be the first and final function of culture. Likewise, a culture composed of continuous criticism cannot possibly carry out its meaning--defining function. To exist, culture must in some respects remain beyond criticism. The notion of being beyond criticism is unthinkable to the modern mind, with its depthless distrust of authority. This is why faith is not even conceived of as a possibility in the modern--postmodern debate between realism and relativism. The repression of faith evidences not only the endless transitional condition of modern social life, but precisely the fallacy of postmodern 'openness'. Complete openness, like complete individuality, is impossible.

Postmodernism is, ironically, an example of cultural repression. To be meaningful, culture must repress what it is not. Postmodernism must repress the idea of faith, because the mere idea of being beyond doubt is contradictory to the postmodern vision of cultural openness. This is why the postmodern discussion stops at belief: belief can be doubted, faith cannot. Herein lies the problem of management ethics. Without a collective capacity for enduring commitment, management ethics becomes vulnerable to the endless rationalizations of the critical intellect. Parker's (1995b) ambivalent search for truth (faith) was intolerable to the critical intellects of his colleagues. Where Parker sought truth, they could only feel/see power: '[W]here, oh where, is some recognition of the role of power?' (Carter, 1995, p. 574). Power is to criticism what truth is to faith. Only truth can stabilize a management ethics.

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## Suffering k

### Overview

#### They are the brokers of trauma on the academic market

Colvin 6 (chris, medical anthropologist and works as Senior Research Officer in Social Sciences and HIV/AIDS, TB and STIs with the Infectious Disease Epidemiology Unit in the School of Public Health and Family Medicine at the University of Cape Town, PhD Candidate at UVA dept of Anthro, Trafficking trauma: Intellectual property rights and the political economy of traumatic storytelling, SSN 0256 004 Online 1992-6049 pp. 171–182)

This article begins with a brief look at Khulumani Support Group, a support group for victims of apartheid-era human rights abuses. After apartheid, after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), these victims were still busy producing the stuff of dramatic public and personal memories. Though there were a range of actors involved in soliciting, promoting, circulating and consuming these stories of trauma, it is the global brokers of traumatic memory – the students and professors, the journalists, the documentary filmmakers, the visiting priests, politicians and psychologists – in whom I am most interested. As I worked with Khulumani, a name for this process of painful, repeated narrativisation about the past presented itself – traumatic storytelling – and an image of the routes of these narratives, the transactions involved, the sites and meanings of consumption took shape in the form of the metaphor of political economy. This political economy of traumatic storytelling was a frequent topic of conversation and controversy among group members, who had grown skeptical of the benefits of participating in this global flow of narrative. This article sketches an outline of this political economy of traumatic storytelling, raises questions about intellectual property rights in the circulation and consumption of traumatic narratives, and explores the recent, ambivalent moves by Khulumani to take back some control over these valued, circulating narrative objects. ¶ Signs of injury’ in circulation In the past two decades, the scope of intellectual property law has been greatly expanded to include a variety of objects, images and ideas that might be called ‘cultural property’ (Handler 2003). Songs, artworks, stories, graphic designs, totems and ritual artefacts have increasingly been brought under the umbrella of a variety of ‘rights regimes’ that seek to protect the rights, especially of marginalised indigenous groups, to maintain control over, and benefit materially from these ‘objects/products’ of their culture (Berryman 1994; Boyle 1996). This article considers a particular – and perhaps peculiar – cultural phenomenon that is only now beginning to emerge as a form of intellectual property in need of ‘protection’. Traumatic storytelling is an increasingly common activity in post-conflict, democratising societies, an activity that produces an ever-expanding volume of narratives of traumatic suffering and recovery. These narratives, solicited by truth commissions, journalists, academics and therapists, now circulate the world through particular relations of production, exchange and consumption and structure what I describe below as a ‘global political economy of traumatic storytelling’. Some victim storytellers in South Africa are pushing for the recognition of these stories as a form of intellectual property and are seeking a range of protections against the manipulation and marketisation of their stories of abuse. How this situation came about and what it might mean for the public sphere’s engagement with images and narratives of abuse, are the subjects of this article.¶ My first encounter with these disillusioned ‘victims of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)’, as they sometimes identified themselves, came through the monthly meetings of the Khulumani Support Group, a victim support and advocacy group in Cape Town. Khulumani is composed of victims of apartheid-era political violence and the Cape Town group was started in coordination with the Cape Town Trauma Centre, a non-governmental organisation (NGO) offering trauma debriefing and counselling to victims of political and criminal violence. The group arose out of monthly meetings that the Trauma Centre and Khulumani held jointly to provide advocacy services to victims and to gently introduce them to the principles and benefits of counselling (Harper and Colvin 2000). Part of every monthly meeting is devoted to ‘storytelling’. At each meeting there are typically between three and seven speakers. The stories are usually short, and the speakers are calm and measured in their narration. They begin with a brief introduction, continue through a summary of key events and people and end with a comment on how they are doing today. These stories are ‘tight’, reduced to the essential elements needed to make a point. During the storytelling there is little intervention from the facilitators. After the story, a facilitator will offer some very quick comments about the psychological experiences of the speaker and audience. After these brief comments, the floor is reopened and new speakers come forward until the time is up.¶ The process of storytelling in these meetings reflects both the model of memory laid out by the TRC as well as some of the features of what Levy and Sznaider (2002) termed ‘cosmopolitan memory’: stories of traumatic suffering, reduced to the most important, shocking and morally obvious details of harm, circulated less as specific histories in need of specific interventions or response but more as ‘signs of injury, symbols of the moral bankruptcy of apartheid and the means of group identity formation through a common rejection of apartheid morality. ¶ Elsewhere, I describe the narrative work of victims as ‘traumatic storytelling’ (Colvin 2004). I use this term to underscore three characteristic dimensions of the particular kind of storytelling in which I am interested. First, it is storytelling specifically about trauma, the traumas of apartheid in particular. It is a kind of storytelling that does not easily admit the ambiguous or the unspectacular. Second, it is storytelling framed through the psychotherapeutic language of trauma. In particular, it is storytelling that typically narrates the conventional psychodynamic stages of trauma: traumatic event followed by, in various combinations, numbness, intrusion, denial, anxiety, a narrative ‘working through’ and, finally, acceptance and integration through storytelling. Third, it is a kind of storytelling that can itself be traumatic for the teller. The TRC’s investment in traumatic storytelling was in part a manifestation of the broader globalisation of psychiatric knowledge about trauma (Breslau 2000). Traumatic storytelling was not only something that was ‘of the moment’ in global forms of popular culture – on middle-class talk shows, magazines and movies. It also was (and remains) a practice sustained by a range of political, institutional and individual advocates. There is a large and growing network of ‘trauma centers’ throughout the world (Summerfield 1999). Globalising forms of trauma discourse and practice also run parallel with globalising forms of political intervention. Peacekeeping troops, conflict resolution experts, diplomats, scholars of democratisation – all can often be found in the same hot spots of post-conflict intervention as trauma counsellors and debriefers. These experts at political and psychic reconstruction are inevitably accompanied by journalists and researchers who are eager to report on the latest forms of post-conflict healing and keen to circulate the latest stories of traumatic violence. They reproduce these traumatic stories and circulate them globally for consumption by a diverse array of audiences. Taken together these diffuse actors, institutions and interests – and the narratives of suffering that are produced, circulated and consumed – form a global network for the circulation of traumatic storytelling. This wide circuit of narrative flow is sustained by a constant stream of journalists, researchers, politicians, priests and psychologists who fly to the next hot spot – today South Africa, tomorrow Iraq – asking permission to record, interpret and circulate ‘victims’ stories’.¶ These stories were circulated beyond the spaces of monthly meetings and interview rooms, into other countries, other cultures and other histories that were largely unknown to group members.1 Khulumani members had a keen sense of this wide-ranging flow of their narratives. They often spoke to me – sometimes with pride and sometimes with frustration and suspicion – about the fact that people in the United States of America, the Netherlands, England, Sweden, Denmark and ‘even the Ivory Coast’ knew their story. These lines of narrative circulation were often described in great detail. Two group members, Monwabisi and Thembile, both clearly remembered every interview and informal encounter they had had with foreign researchers. When I knew the researcher as well, Monwa and Thembile would frequently ask if I had heard from them, if they had produced something with their stories and if other people were learning about Khulumani and the situation of victims in South Africa. ¶ Anxieties of alienation: Commodifying the signs of injury As their stories are increasingly documented and circulated within widening global circuits of media, academic and activist knowledge production, group members are increasingly anxious and frustrated with the personal and political implications of storytelling. They say that they, the victims, should not have to do so much work for so little gain. Traumatic storytelling has not brought them reparations, it has not eased their poverty, it has not forced perpetrators to confess or beneficiaries to admit their own liability. Only on occasion has it seemed to ease the psychological effects of trauma. More often than not, after the brief ‘intervention’ – at the TRC or monthly meeting – they are left to go home alone, with little follow-up support.¶ The various criticisms levelled at traumatic storytelling by members of Khulumani were not unique to this group. Complaints about the TRC and its storytelling practice were well established long before this support group was started (see Ross 2003: 32). The ideas that this kind of storytelling might be a culturally foreign and inflexible mode of individual healing or that storytelling might be a limited response to wider social, political and material needs were not particularly new either. During the first few months of my work with the Trauma Centre and the support group, I indeed encountered all of these criticisms. I quickly discovered another, unexpected aspect of storytelling, though, that introduced a new level of complexity. This new dimension was most clearly brought home to me during the first monthly meetings I attended. Trauma Centre staff involved with the group had warned me that Khulumani had recently been reviewing their standard practice of allowing researchers to sit in on monthly meetings and ask for interviews afterwards. I had long been aware of their ambivalence on this issue and was preparing myself to be asked to stop attending future meetings. Instead of discussing whether or not to allow researchers to attend, however, I soon discovered that the group had been discussing the going ‘market price’ for their stories, comparing notes on compensation with members of other groups who had recently worked with researchers and journalists. The discussion was apparently remarkably detailed and precise, with estimates for a standard one-and-a-half to two-hour recitation ranging from R100 to R150.2 Some complained that these figures were too low and recommended a minimum fee of R200. Maureen said that she would charge no less than R500 because she told a good story. Shirley said that most researchers were from rich countries and ‘R100 was not a lot of money… [we] should negotiate for the benefit of the group as a whole … [we] should not forget that we have bargaining power’. Many people in Trafficking trauma: Intellectual property rights and the political economy of traumatic storytelling 175 the meeting had had contact with researchers, or even worked as ‘lay’ researchers themselves. There were also debates around how to choose group members who would participate in research and how to divide the potential proceeds of these narrative exchanges. In the end, a provisional decision was taken to try and allocate research ‘opportunities’ equally and to divide any proceeds evenly between the individual and the group at large. Despite all of this planning, however, very little money changed hands in such a systematic fashion. Most researchers and journalists got away with paying nothing and those who did pay often conducted these transactions privately, with the standard price of a story ranging between R80 and R100. More often than not, however, when money did change hands, it went towards ‘expenses’ (transport and food) or ‘time’ rather than for the stories themselves. ¶ Despite the lack of systematic exchanges of money for stories, however, it soon became clear that each group member’s ‘story’ had not only been objectified – as a ‘thing’ that a member ‘had’ – but had come to function as a commodity as well. As I spent more time with the group and saw the many connections that these narrative transactions produced beyond the boundaries of the group, I began to imagine the work of storytelling as part of a larger network of relations of production and exchange. For Khulumani, the most visible participants in this system were the Trauma Centre, the TRC, local and foreign researchers and journalists and documentary filmmakers. Less obvious relations of exchange could have included the government agencies victims applied to for social services, other NGOs they came into contact with, international funding organisations, foreign governments, local beneficiaries, perpetrators and other victims. What I encountered, then, when I started working with Khulumani was a heavily storied and documented kind of victim–subject engaged in a process of narrative production and exchange with a range of interlocutors, near and far. In order to describe this phenomenon and look more broadly at the full range of its memorial demands and transactions, I developed a metaphor of the ‘global political economy of traumatic storytelling’. Tracing the circulation of narratives, the involvement of a multitude of actors and the creation of a range of new subjects, object, relationships and meanings, is also a way of opening a discussion about some of the broader effects of the global fascination with the traumatic memories of victims of human rights abuses. In this paper, I am particularly concerned with the consequences of Khulumani’s reluctant embrace of this political economy and its emerging sense that their stories of violation not only ‘belonged’ to them in an abstract way, but were a form of property as well. Wrestling for the means of production¶ One effect of this market for narratives of suffering is that traumatic storytelling has become the major way in which many victims negotiate relationships with Christopher J. Colvin 176 others. Their position in a field of relations between the international community, their national government, civil society, the media and the academy increasingly depends on their ability to produce and circulate engaging stories of suffering and recovery. In the process, victims’ stories become commodified objects that move out into the wider world and structure an entire network of subjects, objects, meanings and relationships. Some other effects include 1 the regulation of the narrative content and structure of stories wherein what sells and what does not become part of shaping the stories people tell 2 the shortening of stories into easily consumable packages that fit within the lines of a membership form, pension application, television interview or case history 3 the evolution of the idea that victims have a single story, ‘my story,’ a unitary, bounded and unchanging narrative that incorporates all that is essential in the ‘story of a victim’ 4 an anxiety over alienation from their story, once commodified.